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THE “UNCONTROVERSIAL” CONTROVERSY IN 
COMPELLED COMMERCIAL DISCLOSURES 
Lauren Fowler* 
 
Federal and state administrative agencies increasingly advance public 
health goals through the use of mandatory disclosures, like warning labels 
on cigarettes, that are intended to both inform and influence consumer 
decisions.  However, the standard for determining whether these 
requirements violate a commercial speaker’s First Amendment rights is 
unsettled.  In Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, the U.S. Supreme 
Court adopted a test that defers to the government’s determination that the 
compelled disclosure of “factual and uncontroversial information” is 
justified.  Since Zauderer was decided, lower courts have disagreed about the 
meaning of “uncontroversial.”  A recent Supreme Court case, National 
Institute of Family & Life Advocates v. Becerra (NIFLA), may have resolved 
the debate by treating “uncontroversial” as a requirement that a disclosure 
not relate to a controversial subject matter.  In doing so, the Court diverged 
from two interpretations commonly adopted by lower courts:  that 
“uncontroversial” refers to the factual accuracy of the disclosed information 
or to the underlying ideology. 
This Note illustrates the public health implications of these various 
interpretations in the context of an ongoing international debate over the 
benefits of breastfeeding and mandatory disclosures with respect to infant 
formula.  It argues that the Court’s position in NIFLA poses a significant 
obstacle to government efforts to protect public health and ignores 
Zauderer’s firm grounding in listeners’ informational interests.  Factual 
accuracy more appropriately limits Zauderer’s scope.  Heightened scrutiny 
should only apply if the government compels a commercial speaker to convey 
opinion.  While concerns about the overuse of warnings for remote or 
unsubstantiated risks are well-founded, this issue may be addressed by 
evaluating whether a particular disclosure fails Zauderer review as 
“unjustified or unduly burdensome.”  This framework for compelled 
disclosures is more strongly supported by the text of Zauderer itself, and it 
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would grant proper deference to a legislature’s policy determination that 
potential health risks justify a disclosure. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In July 2018, the New York Times reported that U.S. delegates to a United 
Nations health assembly threatened to impose trade sanctions and withdraw 
military aid from Ecuador to defeat a resolution promoting breastfeeding.1  
Despite these threats, the World Health Assembly (WHA)2 passed the 
resolution on May 26, 2018, which urged member states to “increase 
investment” in measures to “protect[], promot[e], . . . and support” 
breastfeeding and to implement or strengthen their implementation of legal 
measures incorporating the International Code of Marketing of Breast-Milk 
Substitutes (the “Code”)3 and other “evidence-based recommendations.”4 
Public health officials and foreign diplomats were “stunned” by the United 
States’s opposition to the resolution, which they described as a “marked 
contrast” to President Obama’s general support of the long-established policy 
of the World Health Organization (WHO) in favor of promoting 
breastfeeding.5  The New York Times claimed that the American delegation 
had “embrac[ed] the interests of infant formula manufacturers.”6 
However, a spokesperson from the U.S. Department of Health and Human 
Services (“HHS”) characterized the American delegation’s position 
differently:  “The issues being debated were not about whether one supports 
breastfeeding . . . .  The United States was fighting to protect women’s 
 
 1. Andrew Jacobs, Opposition to Breast-Feeding Resolution by U.S. Stuns World Health 
Officials, N.Y. TIMES (July 8, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/07/08/health/world-
health-breastfeeding-ecuador-trump.html [https://perma.cc/V4RP-LNBE].  In response to the 
threats, Ecuador abandoned its plan to introduce the resolution. Id.  Russia ultimately 
introduced the resolution. Id.  However, the United States successfully negotiated for the 
removal of language calling on the World Health Organization to provide technical support to 
member states trying to end the “inappropriate promotion of foods for infants and young 
children.” Id. 
 2. The WHA is “the decision-making body” of the World Health Organization. World 
Health Assembly, WHO, http://www.who.int/mediacentre/events/governance/wha/en 
[https://perma.cc/XRC8-GDXK] (last visited Feb. 12, 2019). 
 3. The International Code of Breast-Milk Substitutes is a “set of recommendations to 
regulate the marketing of breast-milk substitutes, feeding bottles and teats,” adopted by the 
WHA in 1981. World Health Org. [WHO], The International Code of Marketing of Breast-
Milk Substitutes:  Frequently Asked Questions, at 2 (2017) [hereinafter Code FAQ], 
https://apps.who.int/iris/bitstream/handle/10665/254911/WHO-NMH-NHD-17.1-eng.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/E667-WEHT].  The United States was the only country to vote against the 
Code in 1981, “after an intense lobbying campaign” by American infant formula 
manufacturers. Carolyn Y. Johnson & Amanda Erickson, U.S. Effort to Weaken an 
International Breast-Feeding Resolution Has a Long History, WASH. POST (July 9, 2018), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/to-your-health/wp/2018/07/09/u-s-effort-to-weaken-
an-international-breast-feeding-resolution-has-a-long-history [http://perma.cc/jsn6-mcsw]. 
 4. World Health Assembly [WHA], Infant and Young Child Feeding, at 2, 
WHA71.9 (May 26, 2018), http://apps.who.int/gb/ebwha/pdf_files/WHA71/A71_R9-en.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/NG2N-EZMK]. 
 5. Jacobs, supra note 1. 
 6. Id.; see also Johnson & Erickson, supra note 3 (reporting that the infant formula 
industry heavily lobbied the U.S. delegation in Switzerland, according to an anonymous 
source). 
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abilities to make the best choices for the nutrition of their babies.”7  The 
spokesperson stated that women should not be stigmatized for being unable 
to breastfeed or denied information about breastfeeding alternatives.8 
Often, however, women lack information about risks associated with those 
alternatives.  For instance, studies suggest that many American mothers do 
not believe that formula-fed infants are more likely to get sick than breastfed 
infants,9 despite strong consensus among public health experts to the 
contrary.10  One legal measure urged by the WHO could address the 
information gap:  a requirement that infant formula labels provide 
information about the benefits of breastfeeding and the “dangers associated 
with the unnecessary or improper use of infant formula.”11  This particular 
regulatory technique of advancing public health goals through mandatory 
disclosures is increasingly common.12  However, the constitutionality of 
these disclosures is unsettled.13 
Mandatory disclosures implicate the First Amendment, either directly or 
indirectly through the Fourteenth Amendment.14  And while courts usually 
apply strict scrutiny to compelled speech and intermediate scrutiny to 
restrictions on commercial speech,15 the U.S. Supreme Court adopted a lower 
 
 7. Eli Watkins, NYT:  US Threatened Nations over Breastfeeding Resolution, CNN (July 
9, 2018), https://www.cnn.com/2018/07/08/politics/world-health-assembly-breastfeeding/ 
index.html [https://perma.cc/8Q9R-A97C]. 
 8. Id.  The spokesperson’s latter concern is probably tied to the Code’s prohibition 
against advertising breast-milk substitutes. See infra note 32 and accompanying text.  It is also 
reminiscent of the primary argument for extending First Amendment protection to commercial 
speech:  consumers’ interest in receiving information about products and services. See infra 
notes 126–27. 
 9. Julie Smith et al., Health Professional Knowledge of Breastfeeding:  Are the Health 
Risks of Infant Formula Feeding Accurately Conveyed by the Titles and Abstracts of Journal 
Articles?, 25 J. HUM. LACTATION 350, 350 (2009); see also CDC, INFANT FEEDING PRACTICES 
STUDY II:  RESULTS ch. 9, tbl.9.6 (2008), https://www.cdc.gov/breastfeeding/pdf/ifps/data/ 
ifps2_tables_ch9.pdf [https://perma.cc/96CP-TRSN] (indicating that 15.5 percent of 
American mothers disagree that ear infections and respiratory illness are less likely in 
breastfed babies, and that 36 percent think infant formula is as good as breast milk). 
 10. See infra notes 26–28, 46–52, 60–62 and accompanying text. 
 11. Code FAQ, supra note 3, at 10–11. 
 12. See Allen Rostron, Pragmatism, Paternalism, and the Constitutional Protection of 
Commercial Speech, 37 VT. L. REV. 527, 563–86 (2013) (surveying recent lower court 
decisions on commercial speech issues, including mandatory disclosures about smoking risks, 
radio-frequency energy absorbed by cell phone users, and detailed nutritional information 
about restaurant menu items); Note, Repackaging Zauderer, 130 HARV. L. REV. 972, 972 
(2017) (listing examples of compelled commercial disclosures, like “[s]alt-shaker icons on 
foods deemed to be high in sodium [and] textual warnings that highlight the potential dangers 
of smoking,” and describing such disclosures as “a pervasive, if often unobtrusive, aspect of 
daily life”). 
 13. See infra Parts II.B–C. 
 14. The First Amendment applies to the states through the Due Process Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment. See Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 666–68 (1925) (“[F]reedom 
of speech and of the press—which are protected by the First Amendment from abridgment by 
Congress—are among the fundamental personal rights and ‘liberties’ protected by the due 
process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment from impairment by the States.”). 
 15. See infra Part II.A.  In First Amendment jurisprudence, “commercial speech is an 
expression related solely to the economic interests of the speaker and its audience, generally 
in the form of commercial advertisement for the sale of goods and services, or speech 
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standard for compelled commercial disclosures in Zauderer v. Office of 
Disciplinary Counsel,16 where it held that a mandatory disclosure of “purely 
factual and uncontroversial information about the terms under which . . . 
services will be available” was permissible because it was “reasonably 
related to the State’s interest in preventing deception of consumers.”17  
Lower courts have frequently disagreed about when a disclosure qualifies for 
review under the Zauderer standard and the appropriate test to apply to a 
disclosure that is ineligible for Zauderer review.18  While most courts 
consider “purely factual and uncontroversial” a prerequisite for Zauderer 
review,19 they have defined the phrase differently.20 
The Supreme Court may have offered some clarity with its recent decision 
in National Institute of Family & Life Advocates v. Becerra (NIFLA).21  The 
Court treated “uncontroversial” as a threshold requirement that the disclosure 
not relate to a controversial subject matter.22  In doing so, the Court diverged 
from two interpretations commonly adopted by lower courts:  that 
“uncontroversial” refers (1) to the factual accuracy of the disclosed 
information, or (2) to the implicit ideology underlying the disclosure.23  
However, the Court provided no explanation for its position. 
 
proposing a commercial transaction.” 16A AM. JUR. 2D Constitutional Law § 499 (2009).  The 
exact scope of commercial speech is “not very well-explored,” but an item’s packaging, such 
as its label, is consistently viewed as commercial speech. Nigel Barrella, First Amendment 
Limits on Compulsory Labeling, 71 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 519, 525 (2016). 
 16. 471 U.S. 626 (1985). 
 17. Id. at 651.  Courts have described Zauderer’s standard as “rational-basis review,” a 
“reasonable-relationship rule,” or a “rational relationship test.” See Dayna B. Royal, The 
Skinny on the Federal Menu-Labeling Law & Why It Should Survive a First Amendment 
Challenge, 10 FIRST AMEND. L. REV. 140, 184 (2011).  This Note adopts the “reasonable 
relationship” terminology because the Court’s recent application of the test in National 
Institute of Family & Life Advocates v. Becerra (NIFLA), particularly its scrutiny of the state’s 
justifications, seems less deferential than traditional rational basis review. 138 S. Ct. 2361, 
2376–78 (2018).  However, it is worth noting that Justice Breyer, in his dissenting opinion, 
critiqued the Court’s “searching” standard of review as “incompatible with Zauderer.” Id. at 
2390 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 18. See infra Part II.B.2.  The Supreme Court has provided relatively little guidance about 
how to apply Zauderer. Note, supra note 12, at 972–73. 
 19. See infra Part II.C.  However, the Ninth Circuit treats “factual and uncontroversial” 
as part of the Zauderer test rather than a limit on its scope. See Am. Beverage Ass’n v. City 
& County of San Francisco (Am. Beverage Ass’n II), Nos. 16-16072, 16-16073, 2019 WL 
387114, at *4 (9th Cir. Jan. 31, 2019) (en banc) (“The Zauderer test, as applied in NIFLA, 
contains three inquiries:  whether the notice is (1) purely factual, (2) noncontroversial, and 
(3) not unjustified or unduly burdensome.  A compelled disclosure accompanying a related 
product or service must meet all three criteria to be constitutional.  Neither NIFLA nor any 
other Supreme Court precedent requires that we apply these criteria in any particular order.”) 
(citing Nat’l Inst. of Family & Life Advocates, 138 S. Ct. at 2372).  However, Judge Sandra 
Ikuta challenged this approach as inconsistent with the NIFLA Court’s analytical framework, 
which treats “factual and uncontroversial” as a threshold question for determining whether 
Zauderer applies. Am. Beverage Ass’n II, 2019 WL 387114, at *7–9 (Ikuta, J., dissenting from 
most of the reasoning, concurring in the result) (citing Nat’l Inst. of Family & Life Advocates, 
138 S. Ct. at 2372); see also infra note 174 and accompanying text. 
 20. See infra Part II.C. 
 21. 138 S. Ct. 2361 (2018). 
 22. Id. at 2366. 
 23. See infra Part II.C. 
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This Note illustrates the public health implications of the various 
interpretations of “uncontroversial” in the context of the WHO’s 
recommendation that member countries require infant formula labels to 
disclose the benefits of breastfeeding.  Part I provides an introduction to the 
relevant public health background, first describing the current status of 
mandatory disclosures for infant formula, then exploring the debate about the 
“Breast Is Best” policy.24  Part II presents a brief overview of the related First 
Amendment doctrines of compelled speech and commercial speech, 
followed by a discussion of the Zauderer and NIFLA opinions.  It then 
explores various interpretations of “uncontroversial.”  Part III considers how 
a mandatory disclosure about the risks of infant formula might fare under 
each interpretation.  Finally, Part IV argues that factual accuracy, not 
“uncontroversial subject matter,” appropriately limits Zauderer’s scope. 
I.  PUBLIC HEALTH EFFORTS TO PROMOTE BREASTFEEDING 
Most medical organizations and public health experts consider 
breastfeeding to be the ideal form of infant nutrition and regard increased 
rates of exclusive breastfeeding as a key public health goal.25  Indeed, the 
American Academy of Pediatrics (AAP), Centers for Disease Control and 
Prevention (CDC), and WHO recommend exclusive breastfeeding for an 
infant’s first six months, followed by continued breastfeeding for at least one 
year as solid foods are gradually introduced.26  The AAP stated that “infant 
nutrition should be considered a public health issue and not only a lifestyle 
choice”27 due to demonstrated health benefits for infants and mothers and 
“the health risks of not breastfeeding.”28  Despite this evidence and the 
WHO’s repeated exhortations to member states to adopt legal provisions 
promoting breastfeeding, sales of breast-milk substitutes continue to grow 
 
 24. The “Breast Is Best” adage is frequently used to describe breastfeeding-promotion 
efforts. See, e.g., Joan Y. Meek, Opinion, Breast Is Best:  Why Breastfeeding Is the Greatest 
Public Health Policy of All Time, NEWSWEEK (July 19, 2018, 10:11 AM), 
https://www.newsweek.com/breast-best-why-breastfeeding-greatest-public-health-policy-all-
time-opinion-1032330 [https://perma.cc/HZM5-94U4]; Elissa Strauss, The “Breast Is Best” 
Policy Backlash, CNN (July 11, 2018, 1:13 PM), https://www.cnn.com/2018/07/11/health/ 
breastfeeding-parenting-strauss/index.html [https://perma.cc/4Z8P-8Y4N]. 
 25. See Roni Caryn Rabin, Trump Stance on Breast-Feeding and Formula Criticized by 
Medical Experts, N.Y. TIMES (July 9, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/07/09/well/ 
breastfeeding-trump-resolution.html [https://perma.cc/3NAZ-TG4B] (“[T]he consensus of 
most mainstream medical organizations is that ‘breast is best’ when it comes to infant nutrition 
and health.”); see also Arthur I. Eidelman et al., Breastfeeding and the Use of Human Milk, 
129 PEDIATRICS e827, e827 (2012) (“Breastfeeding and human milk are the normative 
standards for infant feeding and nutrition.”). 
 26. Code FAQ, supra note 3, at 3; Eidelman et al., supra note 25, at e827–28; 
Breastfeeding:  Frequently Asked Questions, CDC, https://www.cdc.gov/breastfeeding/faq/ 
index.htm [https://perma.cc/464G-QSLL] (last visited Feb. 12, 2019). 
 27. Eidelman et al., supra note 25, at e827.  The CDC has also declared that 
“Breastfeeding is an Investment in Health, Not Just a Lifestyle Decision.” Breastfeeding:  Why 
It Matters, CDC, http://www.cdc.gov/breastfeeding/about-breastfeeding/why-it-matters.html 
[https://perma.cc/SSJ2-F8C2] (last updated Feb. 5, 2019). 
 28. Eidelman et al., supra note 25, at e827–28; see also infra notes 46–62. 
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rapidly worldwide, with an expected increase in the global infant formula 
market from $56 billion in 2017 to $70.6 billion by 2019.29 
Part I.A discusses the WHO’s recommended provisions for promoting 
breastfeeding, focusing on mandatory disclosures, and describes current 
mandatory disclosures for formula in the United States.  Part I.B explores the 
debate about the “Breast Is Best” policy.  It begins with a brief review of the 
reported health benefits of breastfeeding and then examines criticism of both 
the policy and underlying science. 
A.  Government-Compelled Disclosures About Formula and Breastfeeding 
The WHO has long viewed the promotion of breastfeeding as an essential 
public health goal and considers “[t]he protection, promotion and support of 
breastfeeding . . . among the most effective interventions to improve child 
survival.”30  The Code, adopted by the WHA in 1981, requires that 
information about “artificial feeding,” including information from health 
workers and on product labels, “explain the benefits of breastfeeding and the 
costs and dangers associated with the unnecessary or improper use of infant 
formula and other breast-milk substitutes.”31  Additionally, the Code 
prohibits advertising or otherwise promoting breast-milk substitutes to the 
general public.32 
Since 1981, the WHA has adopted several resolutions that clarify, extend, 
or update the Code provisions,33 most recently WHA Resolution 71.9.34  The 
Assembly continues to urge member states to implement the Code,35 and the 
WHO has emphasized that “[t]he Code remains as relevant and important as 
when it was adopted in 1981, if not more so.”36  As of April 2018, 136 of 
 
 29. Code FAQ, supra note 3, at 7; Global Infant Formula Market—Insights, COHERENT 
MKT. INSIGHTS (Dec. 2018), https://www.coherentmarketinsights.com/market-insight/ 
infant-formula-market-2330 [https://perma.cc/FBS2-5FQX]. 
 30. Id. at 3. 
 31. Id. at 10–11.  Articles 4.2 and 7.1 of the Code address health workers’ responsibility 
to provide “clear information on . . . the benefits and superiority of breastfeeding . . . [and] the 
health hazards of unnecessary or improper use of infant formula and other breast-milk 
substitutes.” World Health Org. [WHO], International Code of Marketing of Breast-Milk 
Substitutes, at 10, 12 (1981), http://www.who.int/nutrition/publications/code_english.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/N26U-ZACC].  Article 9.2 requires formula containers or labels to have “a 
clear, conspicuous, and easily readable” message that includes the words “Important Notice” 
(or similar language), “a statement of the superiority of breastfeeding,” and a statement that 
formula “should be used only on the advice of a health worker as to the need for its use and 
the proper method of use.” Id. at 13. 
 32. Code FAQ, supra note 3, at 10–11; International Code of Marketing of Breast-Milk 
Substitutes, supra note 31, at 10–12. 
 33. Code FAQ, supra note 3, at 5–6.  For example, WHA Resolution 54.2 increased the 
recommended period of exclusive breastfeeding from four to six months, to six months. Id. at 
6. 
 34. Infant and Young Child Feeding, supra note 4. 
 35. See, e.g., id. at 2. 
 36. Code FAQ, supra note 3, at 7. 
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194 countries had implemented legal measures “covering all, many or few 
provisions of the Code.”37  The United States has implemented none.38 
However, the U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA) imposes certain 
disclosure requirements on infant formula labels pursuant to its authority 
under the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FDCA).39  Specifically, labels must 
include designated nutrient information,40 directions for use,41 a warning 
statement about improper preparation and use,42 and “[a] statement 
indicating that parents should consult their physicians about the use of infant 
formulas.”43  Moreover, the AAP states that pediatricians should serve as 
breastfeeding advocates and “[c]ommunicat[e] with families that 
breastfeeding is a medical priority.”44  However, studies suggest that many 
pediatricians are not strong advocates and do not tell parents about the risks 
associated with formula feeding.45 
B.  The “Breast Is Best” Debate 
Efforts to promote breastfeeding are based on numerous studies that report 
significant health benefits for both breastfed infants and their mothers.46  For 
example, breastfed infants have lower risks of ear infections,47 respiratory 
 
 37. World Health Org. [WHO], Marketing of Breast-Milk Substitutes: National 
Implementation of the International Code, Status Report 2018, at 10 (2018), 
https://apps.who.int/iris/bitstream/handle/10665/272649/9789241565592-eng.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/RXA2-2NME]. 
 38. Id. at 42. 
 39. 21 C.F.R. § 107 (2017).  The authority comes from four sections of the FDCA:  
21 U.S.C. §§ 321, 343, 350a, and 371. Id. 
 40. Id. § 107.10. 
 41. Id. § 107.20(a)–(d). 
 42. Id. § 107.20(e). 
 43. Id. § 107.20(f). 
 44. Eidelman et al., supra note 25, at e836. 
 45. Sharon Radzyminski & Lynn Clark Callister, Mother’s Beliefs, Attitudes, and 
Decision Making Related to Infant Feeding Choices, 25 J. PERINATAL EDUC. 18, 26 (2016). 
 46. See, e.g., Cesar G. Victora et al., Breastfeeding in the 21st Century:  Epidemiology, 
Mechanisms, and Lifelong Effect, 387 LANCET 475, 479–85 (2016) (listing the benefits of 
breastfeeding for infants and mothers).  Evidence of these benefits comes mostly from studies 
conducted in low- or middle-income countries (LMICs). Id. at 476–78, 488.  Data on 
breastfeeding in LMICs tend to be higher quality than data from high-income countries, which 
rarely use the standard WHO indicators of breastfeeding practices (e.g., for exclusive 
breastfeeding under six months and continued breastfeeding at one year). Id.  Another 
important difference between LMICs and high-income countries is that in LMICs, unlike high-
income countries, breastfeeding is more prevalent among the poor. BERNARDO L. HORTA & 
CESAR G. VICTORA, SHORT-TERM EFFECTS OF BREASTFEEDING:  A SYSTEMATIC REVIEW ON THE 
BENEFITS OF BREASTFEEDING ON DIARRHOEA AND PNEUMONIA MORTALITY 33 (2013), 
https://apps.who.int/iris/bitstream/handle/10665/95585/9789241506120_eng.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/39XJ-HTR3].  Consequently, in LMICs, confounding by socioeconomic 
status is likely to underestimate the benefits of breastfeeding. Id.  For a more extensive 
discussion of breastfeeding research in a legal journal, see Pamela Laufer-Ukeles & Arianne 
Renan Barzilay, The Health/Care Divide:  Breastfeeding in the New Millennium, 35 COLUM. 
J. GENDER & L. 264, 272–79 (2018). 
 47. See generally Gayan Bowatte et al., Breastfeeding and Childhood Acute Otitis Media:  
A Systematic Review and Meta-Analysis, ACTA PÆDIATRICA, Dec. 2015, at 85.  This study 
found that exclusive breastfeeding for the first six months is associated with the lowest risk of 
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infections,48 gastrointestinal infections,49 sudden infant death syndrome 
(SIDS),50 and necrotizing enterocolitis (a serious gastrointestinal disease in 
premature infants).51  Evidence also suggests that breastfeeding may 
decrease the risk of a child becoming overweight or obese and developing 
type 2 diabetes later in life,52 and it may be associated with higher 
intelligence.53  Furthermore, breastfeeding mothers experience both short- 
and long-term health benefits, including decreased postpartum blood loss,54 
as well as lower risks of cardiovascular disease55 and breast cancer.56  
Breastfeeding may also reduce the mother’s risk of type 2 diabetes,57 ovarian 
cancer,58 and rheumatoid arthritis.59  Moreover, public health officials stress 
 
ear infections, but longer duration of breastfeeding and any breastfeeding were also associated 
with reduced risk. Id. at 88–92. 
 48. HORTA & VICTORA, supra note 46, at 33 (suggesting that breastfeeding may reduce 
the risk and severity of respiratory infections).  But see Michael S. Kramer et al., Promotion 
of Breastfeeding Intervention Trial (PROBIT):  A Randomized Trial in the Republic of 
Belarus, 285 JAMA 413, 417 (2001) (finding that breastfeeding did not have a statistically 
significant effect on respiratory tract infections). 
 49. HORTA & VICTORA, supra note 46, at 15–16.  This review found that “more intense 
breastfeeding” practices, particularly exclusive breastfeeding, were associated with a lower 
risk of gastrointestinal infection. Id. at 16–20.  While most studies included in the review were 
observational, the authors did identify three randomized trials that suggested breastfeeding 
reduced the risk of diarrhea. Id. at 1–2, 15. 
 50. STANLEY IP ET AL., BREASTFEEDING AND MATERNAL AND INFANT HEALTH OUTCOMES 
IN DEVELOPED COUNTRIES 93–95 (2007).  While studies generally focus on breastfeeding’s 
protective effect against death in LMICs, a meta-analysis of high-quality primary studies 
shows that breastfeeding also reduces the risk of SIDS in developed countries. Id.  This 
analysis included only studies adjusting for potential confounding variables, such as maternal 
age, socioeconomic status, and exposure to smoking. Id. at 95–97. 
 51. Id. at 98–102.  This finding is supported by four randomized controlled trials. Id. at 
98–100. 
 52. Victora et al., supra note 46, at 480–83.  Most studies were from high-income 
countries. Id. 
 53. Id. at 483–84.  Most studies were from high-income countries. Id.  These studies 
adjusted for several confounding variables, although the authors acknowledged the possibility 
of residual confounding by socioeconomic status. Id.; see also Eidelman et al., supra note 25, 
at e830 (“Consistent differences in neurodevelopmental outcome between breastfed and 
commercial infant formula-fed infants have been reported, but the outcomes are confounded 
by differences in parental education, intelligence, home environment, and socioeconomic 
status.”). 
 54. Eidelman et al., supra note 25, at e831. 
 55. See Eleanor Bimla Schwarz et al., Duration of Lactation and Risk Factors for 
Maternal Cardiovascular Disease, 113 OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY 974, 979–81 (2009) 
(finding that mothers who breastfed for more than twelve months total were 10 percent less 
likely to develop cardiovascular disease than mothers who never breastfed).  This study was 
based on clinical trials and an observational study of postmenopausal women; the authors 
noted the possibility that participants misreported their breastfeeding duration. Id. at 980. 
 56. Eidelman et al., supra note 25, at e832; Victora et al., supra note 46, at 483–85. 
 57. Victora et al., supra note 46, at 484–85.  Breastfeeding is not associated with a 
decreased risk of type 2 diabetes in mothers diagnosed with gestational diabetes. Eidelman et 
al., supra note 25, at e831. 
 58. Victora et al., supra note 46, at 483–85. 
 59. Elizabeth W. Karlson et al., Do Breast-Feeding and Other Reproductive Factors 
Influence Future Risk of Rheumatoid Arthritis?:  Results from the Nurses’ Health Study, 50 
ARTHRITIS & RHEUMATISM 3458, 3461–65 (2004).  The authors acknowledged that 
“unmeasured confounding” could account for the reduced risk.  Id. at 3465. 
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the contamination risks associated with both bottles and infant formula, the 
latter of which “is not a sterile product and . . . may carry germs that can 
cause fatal illnesses.”60  Furthermore, caregivers may overdilute formula, 
particularly when they are unable to buy enough.61  Overdilution leads to 
malnutrition, which makes the infant extremely susceptible to starvation, 
disease, and death.62 
However, as exemplified by the debate surrounding WHA Resolution 
71.9, support for “Breast Is Best” is not universal.  Opponents criticize the 
underlying science, pointing to methodological flaws of the studies reporting 
breastfeeding benefits.63  In particular, most of the research consists of 
observational studies rather than experimental or randomized controlled 
trials,64 which means that the studies establish only that breastfeeding is 
associated with the identified benefits, not that it caused them.65  
Additionally, the data does not clearly indicate whether breast milk, the act 
of breastfeeding, or a combination of the two, may provide the identified 
benefits.66  Critics also emphasize risks associated with breastfeeding, 
 
 60. Code FAQ, supra note 3, at 4. 
 61. Benjamin Mason Meier & Miriam Labbok, From the Bottle to the Grave:  Realizing 
a Human Right to Breastfeeding Through Global Heath Policy, 60 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 
1073, 1083 (2010).  This problem is particularly pervasive in developing countries, where “20 
percent of mothers who used formula were found to have diluted the formula over 40 percent 
more than recommended.” Id. at 1084. 
 62. Id. 
 63. See Laufer-Ukeles & Barzilay, supra note 46, at 278 (“Breastfeeding studies are 
largely based on observations, associations, and correlations without being able to attribute 
causality.  Indeed, one study that identified a correlation between breastfeeding and certain 
health benefits simultaneously warns against attributing causality, arguing that more cautious 
studies are needed to control ‘confounding factors.’”); Carolyn Y. Johnson, The Breastfeeding 
Story Is More Complicated Than You Think, WASH. POST (Feb. 23, 2016), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2016/02/23/what-youve-read-about-
breastfeeding-may-not-be-true [https://perma.cc/XYG6-P6ZA] (“[F]laws in some of the 
studies tracking long-term health effects raise questions about the magnitude—and at times 
the existence—of some of those advantages.”).  The AAP’s Policy Statement on breastfeeding, 
while affirming its recommendation of exclusive breastfeeding, acknowledges these flaws:  
“Major methodologic issues have been raised as to the quality of some of these studies, 
especially as to the size of the study populations, quality of the data set, inadequate adjustment 
for confounders, absence of distinguishing between ‘any’ or ‘exclusive’ breastfeeding, and 
lack of a defined causal relationship.” Eidelman et al., supra note 25, at e828. 
 64. U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., THE SURGEON GENERAL’S CALL TO ACTION 
TO SUPPORT BREASTFEEDING 33 (2011), https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/books/NBK52682/ 
pdf/Bookshelf_NBK52682.pdf [https://perma.cc/AL2P-FJYG].  Prospective randomized 
controlled trials in this context are typically ethically undesirable. See generally Colin Binns 
et al., Ethical Challenges in Infant Feeding Research, 9 NUTRIENTS 59 (2017) (describing 
ethical problems with randomly assigning infants to breastfeeding and nonbreastfeeding 
groups).  The mere existence of these ethical concerns illustrates the strong consensus in the 
medical community about the benefits of breastfeeding. 
 65. See U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., supra note 64, at 33; see also supra note 
63. 
 66. Linda C. Fentiman, Marketing Mothers’ Milk:  The Commodification of Breastfeeding 
and the New Markets for Breast Milk and Infant Formula, 10 NEV. L.J. 29, 48–49 (2009); see 
also Bowatte et al., supra note 47, at 92 (suggesting that differences in the manner of feeding, 
i.e., from the breast or from a bottle, may contribute to the reduced risk of ear infections in 
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particularly the danger of insufficient lactation and starvation—risks that are 
rarely communicated to new parents.67 
Opponents of “Breast Is Best” also criticize the policy itself.  For example, 
some contend that the WHA Resolution ignores “mothers’ right to informed 
choice and bodily autonomy.”68  Others point out that some women may be 
physically unable to breastfeed69 and also note that American employers do 
not routinely accommodate breastfeeding.70  Thus, women should not be 
shamed for not providing their children with the “best” nutrition.71 
Despite these criticisms of the science and the policy, “most mainstream 
medical organizations” agree that “breast is best,”72 and the AAP, CDC, and 
WHO have all declared that promoting breastfeeding is a key public health 
goal.73  While acknowledging the methodological weaknesses of the studies, 
the AAP still concluded that “the documented short- and long-term medical 
and neurodevelopmental advantages of breastfeeding” justify the 
organization’s recommendation for exclusive breastfeeding.74  In light of this 
evidence, why have Congress, the FDA, and state legislatures and agencies 
failed to adopt the Code’s provisions?  This Note suggests that recent 
developments in First Amendment doctrine pose a significant hurdle to 
compelled disclosures about the benefits of breastfeeding. 
II.  ZAUDERER:  THE CONTROVERSIAL COLLISION OF COMPELLED SPEECH 
AND COMMERCIAL SPEECH 
The First Amendment provides that “Congress shall make no law . . . 
abridging the freedom of speech.”75  Several key theories underlie First 
Amendment protection.76  One core principle is that a speaker—whether a 
 
breastfed infants).  Thus, it is unclear whether infants who are bottle-fed breast milk would 
experience the same reported benefits as infants fed directly from the breast. 
 67. See Fentiman, supra note 66, at 50; Strauss, supra note 24. 
 68. Kavin Senapathy, The ‘Breast Is Best’ Breastfeeding Campaign Is Misguided, DAILY 
BEAST (July 23, 2018, 5:00 AM), https://www.thedailybeast.com/the-breast-is-best-
breastfeeding-campaign-is-misguided [https://perma.cc/99T7-NCWR]; see also supra note 8 
and accompanying text. 
 69. Laufer-Ukeles & Barzilay, supra note 46, at 283–84.  But see Eidelman et al., supra 
note 25, at e827 (“Medical contraindications to breastfeeding are rare.”). 
 70. Laufer-Ukeles & Barzilay, supra note 46, at 279–82. 
 71. See Watkins, supra note 7 (quoting an HHS spokesperson who stated that “[m]any 
women are not able to breastfeed for a variety of reasons, these women should not be 
stigmatized”); see also Laufer-Ukeles & Barzilay, supra note 46, at 284 (“These medical 
guidelines have ballooned into a pervasive cultural pressure to breastfeed, which even includes 
shaming for those who fail to comply with the newly established norms.”). 
 72. Rabin, supra note 25. 
 73. See supra notes 25–28 and accompanying text. 
 74. Eidelman et al., supra note 25, at e827–28. 
 75. U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
 76. See Timothy Zick, Professional Rights Speech, 47 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1289, 1344–45 
(2015) (identifying “autonomy, self-government, and the search for truth” as the “principal” 
First Amendment theories); see also Robert Post, Compelled Commercial Speech, 117 W. VA. 
L. REV. 867, 871 (2015) (“First Amendment jurisprudence contains distinct doctrinal regimes 
that apply to distinct forms of speech . . . because the Constitution values different kinds of 
speech for different reasons.”). 
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private individual or commercial entity77—“has the autonomy to choose the 
content of his own message.”78  This autonomy is implicated both when the 
government restricts speech and when it compels someone to speak.79  First 
Amendment protection is also grounded in listeners’ interests—specifically, 
“the public’s interest in receiving information,” which is essential to listener 
autonomy and effective self-government.80  However, the Court has weighed 
these interests differently depending on context, “impos[ing] tight constraints 
upon government efforts to restrict, e.g., ‘core’ political speech” but “looser 
constraints” upon government regulation of commercial speech.81 
However, growing protection for commercial speech has put the First 
Amendment “on a collision course” with public health.82  Mandatory 
disclosures and warnings are widely used as a regulatory tool in public 
health,83 but the constitutionality of these requirements is unsettled.84  Lower 
courts have struggled to determine what types of disclosures fall within 
Zauderer’s scope, how to apply the test to those disclosures, and what level 
of scrutiny to apply to disclosures outside Zauderer’s scope.85 
Part II.A provides an overview of commercial speech doctrine and 
compelled speech doctrine, respectively, since Zauderer is generally 
 
 77. See Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods. Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 68 (1983) (“A company has 
the full panoply of protections available to its direct comments on public issues . . . .”). 
 78. Hurley v. Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Grp. of Bos., Inc., 515 U.S. 557, 573 
(1995).  The Court described this autonomy as “the fundamental rule of protection under the 
First Amendment.” Id. 
 79. See Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626, 650 (1985) (“[I]n some 
instances compulsion to speak may be as violative of the First Amendment as prohibitions on 
speech.”); see also infra Part II.A.1. 
 80. Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. Pub. Utils. Comm’n, 475 U.S. 1, 8 (1986) (plurality opinion); 
see also infra Parts II.A.2, II.B.1.  Some scholars have also argued that First Amendment 
doctrine should protect a listener’s interest in not being subjected to government-mandated 
speech—a “right against compelled listening.” Caroline Mala Corbin, The First Amendment 
Right Against Compelled Listening, 89 B.U. L. REV. 939, 980 (2009) (“[W]hen the 
government makes a captive audience listen against its will to a government message, it runs 
roughshod over individuals’ right to control their own development and decision-making 
processes.”); see also Ellen P. Goodman, Visual Gut Punch:  Persuasion, Emotion, and the 
Constitutional Meaning of Graphic Disclosure, 99 CORNELL L. REV. 513, 531 (2014).  In the 
context of private speech, restrictions to protect listeners from “intrusive or unwelcome 
messages” are impermissible, with limited exceptions. Goodman, supra, at 530. 
 81. Sorrell v. IMS Health, Inc., 564 U.S. 552, 582 (2011) (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 82. Richard J. Bonnie, The Impending Collision Between First Amendment Protection for 
Commercial Speech and the Public Health:  The Case of Tobacco Control, 29 J.L. & POL. 
599, 600 (2014); see also Amanda Shanor, The New Lochner, 2016 WIS. L. REV. 133, 135 
(stating that while “federal and state administrative regimes have moved towards lighter-
touch, often information-based, forms of governance” like mandated disclosures, these 
regulatory tools “appear more speech-regulating than earlier conduct regulations, thereby 
rendering them more susceptible to First Amendment challenge”). 
 83. See, e.g., Paula J. Dalley, The Use and Misuse of Disclosure as a Regulatory System, 
34 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1089, 1090 (2007) (“Mandatory disclosure has become a sort of 
‘regulation-lite’ extolled even by those who would ordinarily oppose regulation.”); supra note 
12 and accompanying text. 
 84. Micah L. Berman, Clarifying Standards for Compelled Commercial Speech, 50 
WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 53, 54–55 (2016). 
 85. See id. at 65–85 (describing various open questions about Zauderer). 
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regarded as an exception to these doctrines or a synthesis of them.86  Part II.B 
discusses Zauderer itself, then examines the Court’s treatment of Zauderer 
in NIFLA.  Part II.C explores one specific area of disagreement:  what it 
means for a disclosure to be “uncontroversial.” 
A.  The Doctrinal Foundations:  Commercial Speech 
and Compelled Speech 
The compelled and commercial speech doctrines address speech in 
disparate contexts and have accordingly been grounded in different First 
Amendment interests.  Compelled speech doctrine arose out of government 
attempts to compel individuals to convey political or ideological messages, 
efforts that the Court has viewed primarily as violations of the speaker’s 
autonomy interests—their “freedom of mind.”87  In contrast, commercial 
speech doctrine originated in cases where the government banned advertising 
to protect consumers from making bad choices and emphasizes the listener’s 
interest in receiving factual information.88  Before exploring how listeners’ 
and speakers’ interests collide in compelled commercial speech doctrine, this 
Note provides an overview of the two foundational doctrines. 
1.  Compelled Speech Doctrine:  Protecting Speakers’ Autonomy 
First Amendment protection against government-compelled speech 
originates from cases about “core political speech and religious objectors.”89  
Compelled speech doctrine focuses on speaker interests in autonomy and 
“freedom of mind,” but it also implicates listener interests, such as the right 
to receive genuine expression that has not been distorted by government 
compulsion.90  This right is essential for effective self-government.91  
Accordingly, strict scrutiny applies when the government attempts to compel 
individuals or corporations to express or convey political or ideological 
messages.92 
 
 86. See, e.g., Barrella, supra note 15, at 526 (describing Zauderer as a “synthesis” of the 
commercial speech and compelled speech doctrines); Note, supra note 12, at 972 (stating that 
Zauderer is an exception to the “well-settled” intermediate scrutiny standard for regulations 
of commercial speech).  But see infra note 155 (explaining that some consider Zauderer an 
application of the intermediate scrutiny standard). 
 87. See Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 714 (1977) (“The right to speak and the right 
to refrain from speaking are complementary components of the broader concept of ‘individual 
freedom of mind.’” (quoting W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 637 
(1943))); see also infra Part II.A.1. 
 88. See infra Part II.A.2. 
 89. Barrella, supra note 15, at 523. 
 90. Dayna B. Royal, Resolving the Compelled-Commercial-Speech Conundrum, 
19 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 205, 209–10 (2011). 
 91. Id. at 210–11.  The public must be able to freely discuss political, religious, and 
economic issues to elect the best representatives and truly “consent” to being governed. See 
id. at 210 n.29 (“If listeners receive forced expression, individual judgments and the common 
judgment will be infected with the government’s coercion.”). 
 92. See, e.g., Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. Pub. Utils. Comm’n, 475 U.S. 1, 16, 19 (1986) 
(plurality opinion) (stating that “[f]or corporations as for individuals, the choice to speak 
includes within it the choice of what not to say,” and that the government may not “compel 
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The Court first addressed the problem of government-compelled speech in 
West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette,93 where it invalidated a 
state requirement that students in public schools salute and pledge allegiance 
to the American flag.94  Jehovah’s Witnesses children who refused to comply 
due to religious objections were expelled, and their parents were prosecuted 
or threatened with prosecution.95  The Court suggested that compulsion to 
declare a belief might be justified “only on even more immediate and urgent 
grounds” than restrictions of speech and concluded that the state’s asserted 
interest in fostering national unity was insufficient to sustain the mandatory 
pledge.96 
The First Amendment also provides protection against compulsion to 
convey another’s message even where the speaker is not required to express 
faith or agreement with the message.  In Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. 
Tornillo,97 the Court held unconstitutional a Florida statute requiring a 
newspaper to publish the replies of a political candidate it had criticized.98  
Proponents of the statute argued that newspaper monopolies frequently 
presented only one side of a political or ideological issue, thereby threatening 
the First Amendment interest in a “marketplace of ideas” and an informed 
public.99  However, the Court contended that government-enforced access 
may actually reduce the public’s ability to receive information about political 
issues because editors might decide “to avoid controversy” rather than 
criticizing a candidate and being forced to devote its limited column space to 
a reply.100  Such a result would undermine a fundamental purpose of the First 
Amendment, which is “to protect the free discussion of governmental 
affairs,” including discussion of candidates.101  The Court ruled that 
compelling newspapers to publish material is an unconstitutional content-
based regulation of the press and noted that the statute “operates as a 
command in the same sense as a statute or regulation forbidding appellant to 
publish specified matter.”102 
The Court’s decision in Tornillo established “[t]he constitutional 
equivalence of compelled speech and compelled silence,” a principle that 
 
corporate speakers to propound political messages with which they disagree” unless the 
regulation is “a narrowly tailored means of serving a compelling state interest”); W. Va. State 
Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 639 (1943) (noting that freedoms of speech, press, 
assembly, and worship “are susceptible of restriction only to prevent grave and immediate 
danger to interests which the State may lawfully protect”). 
 93. 319 U.S. 624 (1943). 
 94. Id. at 642. 
 95. Id. at 629–30. 
 96. Id. at 633, 641. 
 97. 418 U.S. 241 (1974). 
 98. Id. at 256–57. 
 99. Id. at 251–53. 
 100. Id. at 256–57.  In this sense, a speech compulsion may also function as a speech 
restriction. 
 101. Id. at 257 (quoting Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214, 218 (1966)). 
 102. Id. at 256. 
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applies beyond cases involving the press.103  In Wooley v. Maynard,104 the 
Court relied on Barnette and Tornillo for the proposition that the First 
Amendment protects “both the right to speak freely and the right to refrain 
from speaking at all.”105  New Hampshire law required noncommercial cars 
to bear a license plate with the state’s motto, “Live Free or Die,” and made it 
a misdemeanor to obscure the motto.106  A Jehovah’s Witness who objected 
to the message on moral, religious, and political grounds was fined and jailed 
for covering up the motto on his and his wife’s license plates.107  The Court 
held that the state could not force an individual to disseminate an ideological 
message.108 
Strict scrutiny also applies to compelled disclosure of facts when the 
regulation burdens “fully protected expression” rather than “[p]urely 
commercial speech.”109  In Riley v. National Federation of the Blind of North 
Carolina,110 the Court applied strict scrutiny to a North Carolina law 
requiring professional fundraisers to disclose to potential donors the 
percentage of the charitable donation that the fundraiser would retain.111  The 
Court stated that speech does not “retain[] its commercial character when it 
is inextricably intertwined with otherwise fully protected speech.”112  The 
factual disclosure required by the state, though possibly relevant to potential 
donors, constituted a substantial burden on that protected speech.113  The 
Court invalidated the disclosure requirement and pointed to more narrowly 
tailored options for addressing donors’ misperceptions about how much of 
 
 103. Riley v. Nat’l Fed’n of the Blind, 487 U.S. 781, 797 (1988).  Despite this 
“equivalence,” the Court has regarded compelled speech as less burdensome than speech 
restrictions; for example, it deemed mandatory disclosure of campaign contributions “the least 
restrictive means” to reduce “campaign ignorance and corruption.” Buckley v. Valeo, 424 
U.S. 1, 68 (1976).  Similarly, where the government seeks to prevent or correct consumer 
deception, compelled commercial disclosures are preferable to advertising restrictions. See 
Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626, 651 (1985). 
 104. 430 U.S. 705 (1977). 
 105. Id. at 714. 
 106. Id. at 707. 
 107. Id. at 707–08. 
 108. Id. at 713.  The Court applied strict scrutiny and concluded that “where the State’s 
interest is to disseminate an ideology, no matter how acceptable to some, such interest cannot 
outweigh an individual’s First Amendment right to avoid becoming the courier for such 
message.” Id. at 717.  Uncertainty remains about what qualifies as “ideological speech,” 
especially “in the context of abortion informed consent laws.” Nadia N. Sawicki, Informed 
Consent as Compelled Professional Speech:  Fictions, Facts, and Open Questions, 50 WASH. 
U. J.L. & POL’Y 11, 41 (2016). 
 109. Riley v. Nat’l Fed’n of the Blind, 487 U.S. 781, 796–98, 796 n.9 (1988); see also 
Hurley v. Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Grp. of Bos., Inc., 515 U.S. 557, 573 (1995) 
(“[T]his general rule, that the speaker has the right to tailor the speech, applies not only to 
expressions of value, opinion, or endorsement, but equally to statements of fact the speaker 
would rather avoid . . . .”). 
 110. 487 U.S. 781 (1988). 
 111. Id. at 786, 796–98. 
 112. Id. at 796.  Charitable solicitations are fully protected. Id. at 795–96. 
 113. Id. at 797–98.  The Court reasoned that the disclosure could impede professional 
fundraisers’ efforts to raise money for charities; for example, a potential donor who dislikes 
the disclosed percentage would probably “close[] the door or hang[] up the phone” without 
allowing the fundraiser to explain the amount. Id. at 799–800. 
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their donation goes to charity.114  However, the Court noted that “[p]urely 
commercial speech is more susceptible to compelled disclosure 
requirements.”115  While First Amendment jurisprudence has traditionally 
permitted greater regulation of commercial speech than ideological 
speech,116 recent cases reflect growing protection for commercial speakers. 
2.  Commercial Speech Doctrine:  Shifting Focus 
from Listeners to Speakers 
Commercial speech jurisprudence is “unsettled and hotly disputed 
terrain.”117  The Supreme Court denied First Amendment protection to 
commercial speech until 1974 and subsequently indicated that, even though 
such speech was entitled to protection, it occupied a “subordinate position in 
the scale of First Amendment values.”118  However, over the past two 
decades, the Court has provided substantial protection to commercial speech, 
at least in the context of speech restrictions.119  In Sorrell v. IMS Health, 
Inc.,120 the Court concluded that “heightened scrutiny” applies to content-
based burdens on speech, even those imposed on commercial speech.121  
While the extension of First Amendment protection to commercial speech 
was initially based on consumers’ “interest in the free flow of commercial 
information,”122 recent decisions have been more attentive to commercial 
speakers’ autonomy interests.123  Critics of this trend warn that because 
almost all human action occurs through speech, the First Amendment could 
become a nearly unlimited tool for commercial deregulation.124 
 
 114. Id. at 800–01. 
 115. Id. at 796 n.9. 
 116. See infra note 128 and accompanying text. 
 117. Rostron, supra note 12, at 553.  One key disagreement is whether commercial speech 
merits less protection than political and ideological speech.  Several justices have questioned 
the differential treatment of commercial speech. See Goodman, supra note 80, at 518 n.21.  
Justice Thomas has argued that the Court should adopt strict scrutiny for regulations of 
commercial speech, stating that he “do[es] not see a philosophical or historical basis for 
asserting that commercial speech is of lower value than noncommercial speech.” See 
44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 522–23 (1996) (Thomas, J., concurring); 
see also Goodman, supra note 80, at 529 n.92 (describing Justice Thomas as “the leading 
advocate” for treating commercial and noncommercial speech equally). 
 118. Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass’n, 436 U.S. 447, 456 (1978). 
 119. See Nat Stern & Mark Joseph Stern, Advancing an Adaptive Standard of Strict 
Scrutiny for Content-Based Commercial Speech Regulation, 47 U. RICH. L. REV. 1171, 1182 
(2013) (noting that, since 1995, the Court has repeatedly invalidated commercial speech 
restrictions). 
 120. 564 U.S. 552 (2011). 
 121. Id. at 565–66. 
 122. Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748, 763–64 
(1976); see also Shanor, supra note 82, at 143 (“The commercial speech doctrine was forged 
as a tool of consumer protection to secure the value of commercial speech to society, not to 
ensure the autonomy interests of commercial speakers.”). 
 123. See Berman, supra note 84, at 76. 
 124. See, e.g., Janus v. Am. Fed’n of State, Cty., & Mun. Emps., Council 31, 138 S. Ct. 
2448, 2501–02 (2018) (Kagan, J., dissenting) (“Speech is everywhere—a part of every human 
activity . . . .  For that reason, almost all economic and regulatory policy affects or touches 
speech.  So the majority’s road runs long.  And at every stop are black-robed rulers overriding 
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The Supreme Court first recognized First Amendment protection for 
commercial speech in Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens 
Consumer Council (Virginia Pharmacy).125  The Court’s principal 
justification for extending First Amendment protection to commercial speech 
was individual consumers’ and society’s “interest in the free flow of 
commercial information.”126  The Court rejected a “highly paternalistic” ban 
on advertising prescription drug prices, arguing that “people will perceive 
their own best interests if only they are well enough informed,” which is 
better achieved by “open[ing] the channels of communication” than by 
“clos[ing] them.”127  However, commercial speech needs less protecting 
because of certain “commonsense differences” between commercial speech 
and other kinds of speech, such as the lower probability that commercial 
speech will be chilled by regulation.128  For example, the state may restrict 
“deceptive or misleading” commercial speech,129 or it may require a 
particular format or additional disclosures to prevent deception.130 
In Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Service Commission,131 
the Court reaffirmed that the First Amendment protects commercial speech 
 
citizens’ choices.”); IMS Health, 564 U.S. at 588–90 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (arguing that the 
Court’s content-based analysis of commercial speech restrictions “threatens significant 
judicial interference with widely accepted regulatory activity”); Shanor, supra note 82, at 133 
(“Because nearly all human action operates through communication or expression, the First 
Amendment possesses near total deregulatory potential.”). 
 125. 425 U.S. 748 (1976).  The Court described commercial speech as “speech which does 
‘no more than propose a commercial transaction.’” Id. at 762 (quoting Pittsburgh Press Co. v. 
Human Relations Comm’n, 413 U.S. 376, 385 (1973)).  Advertising constitutes commercial 
speech even if it “links a product to a current public debate.” Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. 
v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557, 563 n.5 (1980); see also Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods. 
Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 67–68 (1983) (finding that a drug company’s pamphlets promoting 
contraceptives were properly classified as commercial speech “notwithstanding the fact that 
they contain discussions of important public issues such as venereal disease and family 
planning”). 
 126. Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 763–64.  In this case, the free flow of 
information was essential for individual consumers—especially “the poor, the sick, and 
particularly the aged”—to compare drug prices; access to this information “could mean the 
alleviation of physical pain or the enjoyment of basic necessities.” Id.  More generally, “the 
free flow of commercial information is indispensable” in a free market system, as the market 
functions properly only if citizens make “intelligent and well-informed” economic policy 
decisions. Id. at 765. 
 127. Id. at 770. 
 128. Id. at 771 n.24.  The Court’s commercial speech jurisprudence over the following 
decades echoed this premise:  “Our jurisprudence has emphasized that ‘commercial speech 
[enjoys] a limited measure of protection, commensurate with its subordinate position in the 
scale of First Amendment values,’ and is subject to ‘modes of regulation that might be 
impermissible in the realm of noncommercial expression.’” Bd. of Trs. of State Univ. of N.Y. 
v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 477 (alteration in original) (quoting Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass’n, 
436 U.S. 447, 456 (1978)); see also Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp., 447 U.S. at 564 n.6 
(“[C]ommercial speech, the offspring of economic self-interest, is a hardy breed of expression 
that is not ‘particularly susceptible to being crushed by overbroad regulation.’” (quoting 
Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350, 381 (1977))). 
 129. Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 770–71. 
 130. Id. at 771 n.24. 
 131. 447 U.S. 557 (1980). 
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because of the information it provides to consumers.132  The Court then 
articulated a four-step analysis for restrictions on commercial speech, which 
focuses on whether a regulation of protected commercial speech133 “directly 
advances” a “substantial” government interest and is “not more extensive 
than is necessary to serve that interest.”134  The Central Hudson analysis has 
traditionally been understood as establishing intermediate scrutiny.135  The 
government must demonstrate a “reasonable” fit between the legislature’s 
ends and its means, which must be narrowly tailored but not necessarily the 
least restrictive option.136  However, since 1995, the Court has repeatedly 
struck down government efforts to restrict nonmisleading speech about legal 
commercial activities, adopting a “muscular” version of Central Hudson’s 
requirement that the regulation not be unnecessarily extensive.137 
This trend continued in IMS Health, where the Court emphasized that 
“heightened scrutiny” applies to content-based burdens on speech and stated 
that “[c]ommercial speech is no exception.”138  The Vermont statute that was 
challenged prohibited the sale, disclosure, and use of information about 
individual doctors’ prescribing practices.139  The prohibition expressly 
applied to the use of this information for marketing prescription drugs and 
 
 132. Id. at 563 (“The First Amendment’s concern for commercial speech is based on the 
informational function of advertising.”). 
 133. The first prong of the Central Hudson test asks whether the First Amendment protects 
the commercial expression at issue. Id. at 566.  To receive protection, commercial speech 
“must concern lawful activity and not be misleading.” Id. 
 134. Id. 
 135. Post, supra note 76, at 881. 
 136. Bd. of Trs. of State Univ. of N.Y. v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 480 (1989) (describing the 
“fit” as “not necessarily the single best disposition but one whose scope is ‘in proportion to 
the interest served’” (quoting In re R.M.J., 455 U.S. 191, 203 (1982))).  The Court has noted 
that “if there are numerous and obvious less-burdensome alternatives to the restriction on 
commercial speech, that is certainly a relevant consideration in determining whether the ‘fit’ 
between ends and means is reasonable.” City of Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc., 507 
U.S. 410, 417 n.13 (1993). 
 137. Stern & Stern, supra note 119, at 1182; see, e.g., Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 
U.S. 525, 561–66 (2001) (finding that advertising regulations did not “reasonabl[y] fit” the 
state’s goal of reducing tobacco use by minors, where state banned smokeless tobacco or cigar 
advertising within a 1000-foot radius of a school or playground, and also required that any 
point-of-sale advertising at stores within this radius be placed higher than five feet from the 
floor).  Professor Robert Post criticizes Central Hudson’s “not more extensive than is 
necessary” requirement as “so vague that it has sometimes functioned chiefly to provide a 
hunting license for judges who dislike market regulations.” Post, supra note 76, at 885. 
 138. Sorrell v. IMS Health, Inc., 564 U.S. 552, 565–66 (2011).  Justice Breyer criticized 
the majority’s application of a “standard yet stricter than Central Hudson,” pointing out that 
content-based regulations have never “before justified greater scrutiny when regulatory 
activity affects commercial speech” because “[r]egulatory programs necessarily draw 
distinctions on the basis of content.” Id. at 588–90 (Breyer, J., dissenting); see also Claudia E. 
Haupt, The Limits of Professional Speech, 128 YALE L.J.F. 185, 188 (2018) (“[T]he doctrine 
of content neutrality . . . is incompatible with professional speech . . . .  [T]he regulation of 
professional speech, in order to achieve its aim, cannot be content-neutral; indeed, the value 
of professional advice depends on its content.”).  Justice Breyer warned that “[i]f the Court 
means to create constitutional barriers to regulatory rules that might affect the content of a 
commercial message, it . . . threatens significant judicial interference with widely accepted 
regulatory activity.” IMS Health, 564 U.S. at 590 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 139. IMS Health, 564 U.S. at 558–59. 
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provided exceptions for healthcare research and educational communications 
to patients.140  Legislative findings accompanying the statute revealed that 
its express purpose and effect were to “diminish the effectiveness of 
marketing by manufacturers of brand-name drugs,”141 with the ultimate 
policy goals of promoting public health and decreasing health-care costs.142  
Because the statute disfavored particular content, the Court concluded that 
heightened judicial scrutiny was required.143  The Court acknowledged that 
Vermont’s policy goals may be proper but rejected the State’s paternalistic 
means—restricting access to truthful information out of the fear that people 
would make bad decisions.144  The Court emphasized that a “consumer’s 
concern for the free flow of commercial speech often may be far keener than 
his concern for urgent political dialogue,” particularly in the public health 
context, “where information can save lives.”145  Furthermore, the ongoing 
debate over the merits of doctor-specific marketing and brand-name drugs 
must be resolved through “free and uninhibited speech.”146  The government 
may not advance its own position by burdening its opponents’ speech.147  In 
striking down the Vermont statute, the IMS Health Court thus invoked both 
the speaker’s autonomy interest and consumers’ informational interest. 
In restrictions on commercial speech, the autonomy interests of 
commercial speakers are aligned with listeners’ interests in receiving 
information—both are undermined when the government impedes the flow 
of nonmisleading commercial speech.  But when the government seeks to 
compel commercial speech, those interests may clash.148  In Zauderer, which 
drew heavily on the rationale of Virginia Pharmacy, listeners’ interests 
prevailed.149 
B.  The Legal Standard for Compelled Commercial Speech 
Zauderer established a deferential standard of review for compelled 
commercial disclosures, holding that “an advertiser’s rights are adequately 
protected as long as disclosure requirements are reasonably related to the 
State’s interest in preventing deception of consumers.”150  Thus, compulsions 
 
 140. Id. at 558–60. 
 141. Id. at 565.  The state found that such marketing caused “hasty and excessive reliance” 
on brand-name drugs rather than safer, less expensive generic alternatives, and “increase[d] 
the cost of health care and health insurance.” Id. at 561. 
 142. Id. at 576. 
 143. Id. at 565. 
 144. Id. at 577. 
 145. Id. at 566 (quoting Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350, 384 (1977)). 
 146. Id. at 578–79. 
 147. Id. 
 148. However, “increasing the volume of information may not always serve the 
constitutional interest in the ‘free flow’ of information,” because consumers may experience 
“information overload.” Jonathan H. Adler, Compelled Commercial Speech and the Consumer 
“Right to Know,” 58 ARIZ. L. REV. 421, 437 (2016).  Furthermore, because “[a] product label 
or advertisement can only hold so much information,” a disclosure requirement may force a 
seller to omit “another set of information more valued by consumers.” Id. at 445–46. 
 149. See infra Part II.B.1. 
 150. Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626, 651 (1985). 
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of commercial speech are treated more deferentially than restrictions, unlike 
in the context of noncommercial speech, where compulsions and restrictions 
are constitutionally equivalent.151 
However, controversy regarding Zauderer’s scope and application persists 
more than thirty years later, as lower courts disagree over the significance of 
various elements of the opinion.152  The question of how much weight to give 
to the speaker’s interests and the listeners’ interests—which are not aligned 
as they are in speech restrictions—may further complicate the analysis.  Part 
II.B.1 presents the language and holding of Zauderer, and Part II.B.2 
examines NIFLA, the Court’s most recent case discussing Zauderer. 
1.  Zauderer’s Special Treatment of a “Factual and Uncontroversial” 
Disclosure 
In Zauderer, the Court upheld an Ohio State Bar requirement that any 
attorney advertisements “that mention[] contingent-fee rates must . . . inform 
clients that they would be liable for costs (as opposed to legal fees) even if 
their claims were unsuccessful.”153  An attorney who was disciplined for 
violating this requirement challenged the rule as a First Amendment 
violation.154  In upholding the rule, the Court created a new test for compelled 
commercial disclosures distinct from Central Hudson’s standard for 
commercial speech restrictions.155 
The Court reasoned that because First Amendment protection for 
commercial speech is largely based on consumers’ interest in receiving 
information,156 the appellant had a “minimal” First Amendment interest in 
not providing specific factual information.157  Thus, the Court held that “an 
advertiser’s rights are adequately protected as long as disclosure 
requirements are reasonably related to the State’s interest in preventing 
deception of consumers.”158  The Court noted that its commercial speech 
precedents had emphasized that disclosures were much less burdensome than 
bans of advertising, and it had therefore recommended disclosures as a means 
to address potential consumer deception.159  The Court acknowledged, 
 
 151. Goodman, supra note 80, at 519–20; see also supra notes 102–05 and accompanying 
text. 
 152. See infra notes 164–69 and accompanying text. 
 153. Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 633. 
 154. Id. at 634. 
 155. See id. at 651; Royal, supra note 90, at 219 (“The Zauderer Court held Central Hudson 
inapplicable and adopted a more lenient test, a ‘reasonable relationship’ test.”).  But see Am. 
Meat Inst. v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric., 760 F.3d 18, 27 (D.C. Cir. 2016) (en banc) (“[O]ne could 
think of Zauderer largely as ‘an application of Central Hudson, where several of Central 
Hudson’s elements have already been established’” (quoting Supplemental Brief for 
Appellants at 9, Am. Meat Inst., 760 F.3d 18 (No. 13-5281))); Adler, supra note 148, at 435 
(characterizing Zauderer as “a relatively straightforward application of the Central Hudson 
framework” rather than “an alternative test for compelled commercial speech”). 
 156. Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 651. 
 157. Id. 
 158. Id. 
 159. Id. 
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however, that “unjustified or unduly burdensome disclosure requirements” 
might be unconstitutional if they “chill[ed] protected commercial speech.”160 
The Court also distinguished the disclosure at issue from Barnette, 
Tornillo, and Wooley, arguing that “the interests at stake in this case are not 
of the same order” as the interests in those cases:  “Ohio has not attempted to 
‘prescribe what shall be orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion, or other 
matters of opinion or force citizens to confess by word or act their faith 
therein.’”161  Instead, Ohio specified what was “orthodox in commercial 
advertising” by requiring advertisers to include “purely factual and 
uncontroversial information” about the terms of service.162 
The language in Zauderer primarily describes why the disclosure at issue 
in the case was permissible and does not announce a clear test.163  
Consequently, lower courts have interpreted terms differently and disagreed 
over whether certain language in the opinion establishes a prerequisite for 
Zauderer deference or is simply descriptive.164  Areas of disagreement 
include the meaning of “purely factual and uncontroversial,”165 whether 
Zauderer is limited to regulations addressing deception,166 whether Zauderer 
 
 160. Id. 
 161. Id. (quoting W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943)). 
 162. Id. 
 163. Barrella, supra note 15, at 527. 
 164. Id.; see also Note, supra note 12, at 979 (“Zauderer’s treatment in various circuits 
most closely resembles a fractured, frequently contradictory mosaic.”).  A discussion of these 
various interpretations is beyond the scope of this Note, which will focus on the meaning of 
“uncontroversial.”  For a more comprehensive review, see generally Barella, supra note 15; 
and Berman, supra note 84. 
 165. See infra Part II.C.  This Note does not fully explore the meaning of “purely factual,” 
which is taken up directly in cases about graphic cigarette warnings. See infra note 198. 
 166. See Post, supra note 76, at 882.  Professor Post argues that the Court “poorly crafted” 
the sentence “we hold that an advertiser’s rights are adequately protected as long as disclosure 
requirements are reasonably related to the State’s interest in preventing deception of 
consumers.” Id. (quoting Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 651).  He argues that this sentence misled 
some courts into thinking that Zauderer’s scope is limited to disclosures for preventing 
deception and that Zauderer is properly interpreted as “holding that commercial disclosure 
requirements for ‘purely factual and uncontroversial information’ are constitutional ‘as long 
as’ they ‘are reasonably related’ to an appropriate state interest.” Id. (quoting Zauderer, 471 
U.S. at 651); see also Am. Beverage Ass’n v. City & County of San Francisco (Am. Beverage 
Ass’n I), 871 F.3d 884, 892 (9th Cir. 2017) (stating that Zauderer’s “we hold . . .” sentence “is 
best read as a specific application of Zauderer’s more general rule that a purely factual and 
uncontroversial disclosure that is not unduly burdensome will withstand First Amendment 
scrutiny so long as it is reasonably related to a substantial government interest”), aff’d on other 
grounds on reh’g, Nos. 16-16072, 16-16073, 2019 WL 387114 (9th Cir. Jan. 31, 2019) (en 
banc).  The circuit courts that have addressed this issue have “unanimously concluded” that 
Zauderer applies “even in circumstances where the disclosure does not protect against 
deceptive speech.” CTIA-The Wireless Ass’n v. City of Berkeley (CTIA v. Berkeley II), 854 
F.3d 1105, 1116 (9th Cir. 2017), vacated and remanded, 138 S. Ct. 2708 (2018) (mem.).  
However, disputes remain over which state interests are sufficient. Berman, supra note 84, at 
73–77.  The Second Circuit has concluded that “consumer curiosity alone” is insufficient to 
justify a mandatory disclosure. Int’l Dairy Foods Ass’n v. Amestoy, 92 F.3d 67, 74 (2d Cir. 
1996).  Instead, the information must “bear[] on a reasonable concern for human health or 
safety or some other sufficiently substantial governmental concern.” Id.  Then-Judge Brett 
Kavanaugh agreed with the Second Circuit’s conclusion that “providing consumers with 
information” they are interested in is not itself a sufficient government interest. Am. Meat Inst. 
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applies outside of the context of advertising and product labeling,167 whether 
identifying a disclosure as government speech is relevant,168 and the proper 
standard of review if Zauderer does not apply.169  The Supreme Court’s 
decision in NIFLA may have resolved some of this confusion, but it raises 
questions of its own. 
2.  NIFLA:  The Latest Word on Zauderer 
In NIFLA, the Court addressed the constitutionality of a California law 
requiring clinics that “primarily serve pregnant women”170 to provide certain 
government-drafted notices.171  Specifically, the state required licensed 
clinics to disseminate a notice on-site that informed women that California 
provides “immediate free or low-cost access to comprehensive family 
planning services (including all FDA-approved methods of contraception), 
prenatal care, and abortion for eligible women” and instructed women to 
contact the county social services office to determine whether they are 
eligible for these services.172  The state also required unlicensed clinics to 
provide a notice “on site and in all advertising materials,” which stated that 
the “facility is not licensed as a medical facility by the State of California and 
has no licensed medical provider who provides or directly supervises the 
provision of services.”173 
The Court stated that Zauderer did not apply to the licensed-clinic notice, 
because the notice “is not limited to ‘purely factual and uncontroversial 
information about the terms under which . . . services will be available.’”174  
 
v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric., 760 F.3d 18, 31–32 (D.C. Cir. 2016) (Kavanaugh, J., concurring in 
the judgment). 
 167. Compare Nat’l Ass’n of Mfrs. v. SEC (Nat’l Ass’n of Mfrs. II), 800 F.3d 518, 521–24 
(D.C. Cir. 2015) (holding that Zauderer does not apply to compelled disclosures “that are 
unconnected to advertising or product labeling at the point of sale”), with id. at 535–36 
(Srinivasan, J., dissenting) (criticizing the majority’s limit on Zauderer’s scope as without 
precedent and inconsistent with Zauderer’s rationale). 
 168. See Berman, supra note 84, at 81–84 (“One . . . open question is whether 
unambiguously identifying a disclosure as ‘government speech’ leads to an even more relaxed 
standard of review than Zauderer . . . .”). 
 169. Barella, supra note 15, at 539; Berman, supra note 84, at 77–81.  The D.C. Circuit 
and Second Circuit apply Central Hudson, the Sixth Circuit applies strict scrutiny, and some 
courts avoid the question of which standard applies because the regulation fails under either. 
See Barella, supra note 15, at 539. 
 170. Nat’l Inst. of Family & Life Advocates v. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. 2361, 2368 (2018).  The 
California State Legislature sought to regulate crisis pregnancy centers, which are typically 
“pro-life (largely Christian belief-based) organizations that offer a limited range of free 
pregnancy options, counseling, and other services.” Id. (quoting CASEY WATTERS ET AL., 
PREGNANCY RESOURCE CENTERS:  ENSURING ACCESS AND ACCURACY OF INFORMATION 4 
(2015)). 
 171. Id. at 2368. 
 172. Id. at 2369–70. 
 173. Id. 
 174. Id. at 2372 (alteration in original) (quoting Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 
471 U.S. 626, 651 (1985)).  For further support that “Zauderer does not apply outside of these 
circumstances,” the Court cited Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Group of 
Boston, Inc., 515 U.S. 557 (1995), a case about parade organizers’ right to decide which 
groups to include as marchers. Id. 
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According to the Court, the notice did not relate to the services that the clinics 
provided175 but instead “require[d] these clinics to disclose information about 
state-sponsored services—including abortion, anything but an 
‘uncontroversial’ topic.”176  The Court concluded that the notice would fail 
under strict scrutiny and even intermediate scrutiny because it was “wildly 
underinclusive” and a less restrictive alternative existed.177  The Court did 
include a disclaimer, stating that “[c]ontrary to the suggestion in the dissent, 
we do not question the legality of health and safety warnings long considered 
permissible, or purely factual and uncontroversial disclosures about 
commercial products.”178 
The Court did not decide whether Zauderer applied to the unlicensed-
clinic notice, because it concluded that the notice failed even Zauderer’s 
deferential standard.179  It emphasized that “[e]ven under Zauderer, a 
disclosure requirement cannot be ‘unjustified or unduly burdensome,’” 
which would risk “chilling” protected speech.180  To satisfy this standard, the 
Court reasoned, compelled disclosures must “remedy a harm that is 
‘potentially real not purely hypothetical’”181 and “extend ‘no broader than 
reasonably necessary.’”182  The Court concluded that California’s 
justification for the notice, “ensuring that ‘pregnant women in California 
know when they are getting medical care from licensed professionals,’”183 
was “purely hypothetical.”184  Justice Breyer criticized the majority’s 
analysis as “incompatible” with Zauderer:  rather than evaluating whether 
the notice is “reasonably related to the State’s interest,” the majority 
“applie[d] a searching standard of review based on our precedents that deal 
with speech restrictions, not disclosures.”185  The Court also determined that 
 
 175. Id.  Justice Breyer disagreed, arguing that information about free, state-provided 
resources for the same services is “related” to the clinic’s services and stating that “for those 
interested in family planning and abortion services, information about such alternatives is 
relevant information to patients offered prenatal care, just as Casey considered information 
about adoption to be relevant to the abortion decision.” Id. at 2387 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 176. Id. at 2372 (majority opinion); see also id. at 2379 (Kennedy, J., concurring) 
(emphasizing that California “requires primarily pro-life pregnancy centers to promote the 
State’s own preferred message advertising abortions,” which “compels individuals to 
contradict their most deeply held beliefs, beliefs grounded in basic philosophical, ethical, or 
religious precepts, or all of these”).  The Court also concluded that the licensed-clinic notice 
was “not an informed-consent requirement or any other regulation of professional conduct.” 
Id. at 2373–74 (majority opinion). 
 177. Id. at 2375.  Thus, the Court did not resolve the debate over which level of scrutiny is 
appropriate when Zauderer does not apply. See supra note 169 and accompanying text. 
 178. Nat’l Inst. of Family & Life Advocates, 138 S. Ct. at 2376 (citation omitted). 
 179. Id. at 2377–78. 
 180. Id. at 2377 (quoting Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626, 651 
(1985)). 
 181. Id. (quoting Ibanez v. Fla. Dep’t of Bus. & Prof’l Regulation, Bd. of Accountancy, 
512 U.S. 136, 146 (1994)). 
 182. Id. (quoting In re R.M.J., 455 U.S. 191, 203 (1982)). 
 183. Id. (quoting Assemb. 775 § 1(e), 2015–2016 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2015)). 
 184. Id. (quoting Ibanez, 512 U.S. at 146). 
 185. Id. at 2390 (Breyer, J., dissenting).  The NIFLA opinion was authored by Justice 
Thomas, who previously expressed “skeptic[ism] of the premise on which Zauderer rests,” 
which is that, unlike in the political speech context, the First Amendment interests implicated 
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the government-drafted notice “unduly burden[ed]” protected speech 
because it was overbroad and “require[d] covered facilities to post 
California’s precise notice, no matter what the facilities say on site or in their 
advertisements.”186 
C.  What Makes a Commercial Disclosure 
“Factual and Uncontroversial”? 
In finding that Zauderer did not apply to the licensed-clinic notice in 
NIFLA because the state required disclosure of information about abortion, 
the Court addressed one open issue:  the significance of Zauderer’s reference 
to the “factual and uncontroversial information” mandated by the Ohio State 
Bar.187  The NIFLA Court took the position that “uncontroversial” means a 
disclosure related to a controversial topic is ineligible for Zauderer review—
an interpretation that no lower court had adopted, at least outside of the 
context of abortion.188  A review of the case law and scholarship before 
NIFLA reveals two primary arguments for what type of disclosure is eligible 
for review under Zauderer:  (1) the disclosure must contain accurate factual 
information;189 or (2) the disclosure must contain accurate factual 
information that does not implicitly convey ideology, an inquiry that looks 
to whether there is controversy over the normative content or salience of the 
facts.190  This section explores the various approaches to “factual and 
uncontroversial,” focusing on the doctrinal and policy justifications for each 
position, and then suggests possible rationales for the NIFLA Court’s 
position. 
1.  Accurate Factual Information 
Several courts and scholars have interpreted “factual and uncontroversial” 
to limit Zauderer’s scope to disclosures that contain accurate factual 
information.191  In arriving at this conclusion, they draw on both the text of 
 
by compelled commercial speech are “substantially weaker” than those implicated by 
restrictions on speech. Milavetz, Gallop & Milavetz, P.A. v. United States, 559 U.S. 229, 255 
(2010) (Thomas, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (quoting Zauderer, 
471 U.S. at 652 n.14).  NIFLA may vindicate claims that the Court has been “gradually inching 
towards Justice Thomas’s position.” See Goodman, supra note 80, at 529 n.92. 
 186. Nat’l Inst. of Family & Life Advocates, 138 S. Ct. at 2377–78.  But see id. at 2390 
(Breyer, J., dissenting) (“[T]he Court has long held that a law is not unreasonable merely 
because it is overinclusive.”). 
 187. See Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 651. 
 188. Barrella, supra note 15, at 534, 541 (stating that if “controversial” is defined as 
“dealing with controversial subject matter,” “it would be a first,” and that “even a ‘highly 
controversial subject matter’ definition seems unlikely in light of all the cases that have come 
before”).  The only other case that has adopted this interpretation is Evergreen Ass’n v. City 
of New York, which involved a similar disclosure requirement for crisis pregnancy centers. 
740 F.3d 233, 245 n.6 (2d Cir. 2014); see infra notes 259–60. 
 189. See infra Part II.C.1. 
 190. See infra Part II.C.2. 
 191. See, e.g., CTIA v. Berkeley II, 854 F.3d 1105, 1117–18 (9th Cir. 2017), vacated and 
remanded, 138 S. Ct. 2708 (2018) (mem.); Disc. Tobacco City & Lottery, Inc. v. United 
States, 674 F.3d 509, 559 n.8 (6th Cir. 2012); Berman, supra note 84, at 65 (“[T]he ‘factual 
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Zauderer and the Court’s justifications for distinguishing the compelled 
speech in Zauderer from Wooley, Tornillo, and Barnette. 
The Sixth Circuit has concluded that a mandatory disclosure, to be eligible 
for Zauderer’s deferential review, must include accurate factual information 
but need not be uncontroversial.192  In Discount Tobacco City & Lottery, Inc. 
v. United States,193 the court emphasized that the term “noncontroversial” 
appears only once in Zauderer, and “merely describes” the disclosure at issue 
in the case rather than imposing an additional requirement.194  As further 
support for its position, the court noted that elsewhere in the opinion, 
Zauderer refers only to disclosures of “factual information” and “accurate 
information.”195  The court also argued that the 2010 Supreme Court case of 
Milavetz, Gallop & Milavetz, P.A. v. United States196 clearly indicated that a 
disclosure need not be uncontroversial for Zauderer to apply because the 
Court never used the phrase “purely factual and noncontroversial”:  “The 
Court instead uses the language required factual information and only an 
accurate statement when describing the characteristics of a disclosure that is 
scrutinized for a rational basis.”197  Thus, the Sixth Circuit concluded that a 
disclosure is entitled to Zauderer review if it conveys factual information and 
not a personal or political opinion, regardless of whether the disclosure 
“incites controversy.”198 
 
and uncontroversial’ limitation is best read as a check to ensure that any mandated statement 
is factually accurate (or factually uncontroversial).”); Royal, supra note 90, at 235 & n.6 
(arguing that Zauderer should apply when a regulation mandates “disclosure of 
uncontroverted facts about a specific product or service sold,” and stating that “[t]he relevant 
question is whether evidence supports the existence of the facts—and thus whether the facts 
themselves are controverted—not whether the desire to share the information is 
controverted”).  Justice Breyer seems to adopt that position in NIFLA, stating that “[a]bortion 
is a controversial topic and a source of normative debate, but the availability of state resources 
is not a normative statement or a fact of debatable truth.” Nat’l Inst. of Family & Life 
Advocates, 138 S. Ct. at 2388 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 192. Disc. Tobacco City & Lottery, Inc., 674 F.3d at 559 n.8. 
 193. 674 F.3d 509 (6th Cir. 2012). 
 194. Id. at 599 n.8 (“This language appears in Zauderer once and the context does not 
suggest that the Court is describing the characteristics that a disclosure must possess for a 
court to apply Zauderer’s rational-basis rule.”). 
 195. Id. (quoting Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626, 651 n.14 
(1985)).  Specifically, the Zauderer Court stated that “appellant’s constitutionally protected 
interest in not providing any particular factual information in his advertising is minimal” and 
that “[t]he right of a commercial speaker not to divulge accurate information regarding his 
services is not such a fundamental right” that “strict scrutiny must be applied.” Zauderer, 471 
U.S. at 651 & n.14. 
 196. 559 U.S. 229 (2010). 
 197. Disc. Tobacco City & Lottery, Inc., 674 F.3d at 559 n.8 (citing Milavetz, 559 U.S. at 
249–50).  Indeed, neither “uncontroversial” nor “controversial” appear anywhere in the 
Milavetz opinion. See generally Milavetz, 559 U.S. 229. 
 198. Disc. Tobacco City & Lottery, Inc., 674 F.3d at 569.  The court noted that “[f]acts can 
disconcert, displease, provoke an emotional response, spark controversy, and even overwhelm 
reason, but that does not magically turn such facts into opinions.” Id. at 569.  The court’s 
analysis centered on whether graphic warning requirements for cigarette labels were “purely 
factual,” a question which is beyond the scope of this Note.  For contrasting views, compare 
R. J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. FDA, 696 F.3d 1205, 1216–17 (D.C. Cir. 2012), with id. at 
1229–32 (Rogers, J., dissenting), and Disc. Tobacco City & Lottery, Inc., 674 F.3d at 558–61. 
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The Ninth Circuit also concluded that Zauderer applies to mandatory 
disclosures of accurate factual information.199  The court stated that 
“‘uncontroversial’ in this context refers to the factual accuracy of the 
compelled disclosure, not to its subjective impact on the audience.”200  The 
court reasoned that this interpretation was consistent with the facts of 
Zauderer:  the state’s requirement that an attorney disclose a client’s potential 
liability for costs “may have caused controversy,” by damaging the 
reputation of lawyers who offered contingency-fee arrangements or 
discouraging potential customers, but such controversy “did not affect the 
constitutional analysis.”201  Instead, the analysis depends on whether the 
disclosure provides accurate factual information.202  Thus, the Ninth Circuit 
concluded that Zauderer only requires a disclosure to be “purely factual.”203 
Advocates for the “accurate factual information” interpretation disagree 
over the requisite level of consensus about a fact’s accuracy.  They have 
suggested at least three different standards for finding that information is not 
factually accurate under this approach to Zauderer:  (1) where there is any 
disagreement, (2) where there is “reasonable” disagreement by scientists or 
 
 199. CTIA v. Berkeley II, 854 F.3d 1105, 1117–18 (9th Cir. 2017), vacated and remanded, 
138 S. Ct. 2708 (2018) (mem.). 
 200. Id. at 1117.  The Northern District of California previously adopted the same 
interpretation of Zauderer’s text, stating that “‘[u]ncontroversial’ should generally be equated 
with the term ‘accurate’; in contrast, ‘factual’ goes to the difference between a ‘fact’ and an 
‘opinion.’” CTIA-The Wireless Ass’n v. City of Berkeley (CTIA v. Berkeley I), 158 F. Supp. 
3d 897, 904 (N.D. Cal. 2016), aff’d, 854 F.3d 1105 (9th Cir. 2017), vacated and remanded, 
138 S. Ct. 2708 (2018) (mem.).  Judge Sri Srinivasan of the D.C. Circuit also argued for this 
interpretation in his dissenting opinion in National Ass’n of Manufacturers II. 800 F.3d 518, 
538 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (Srinivasan, J., dissenting).  Like the Sixth Circuit in Discount Tobacco, 
Judge Srinivasan emphasized the absence of “uncontroversial” in Milavetz. Id. at 538. 
 201. CTIA v. Berkeley II, 854 F.3d at 1118. 
 202. Id.  The court noted that a compelled disclosure may not be “purely factual” if it is 
“literally true but nonetheless misleading and, in that sense, untrue.” Id. at 1119.  The Ninth 
Circuit later struck down a San Francisco ordinance requiring advertisements for sugar-
sweetened beverages to include the warning that “[d]rinking beverages with added sugar(s) 
contributes to obesity, diabetes, and tooth decay.” Am. Beverage Ass’n I, 871 F.3d 884, 888, 
895 (9th Cir. 2017), aff’d on other grounds on reh’g, Nos. 16-16072, 16-16073, 2019 WL 
387114 (9th Cir. Jan. 31, 2019) (en banc).  The court found that the accuracy of the warning 
was “in reasonable dispute” because of evidence that those health conditions may not develop 
if sugar-sweetened beverages are consumed in moderation and the individual does not 
consume more calories than she uses. Id. at 895.  Furthermore, the court said that the warning 
was “misleading” because it was required only in advertisements for sugar-sweetened 
beverages, not for other products with as much or more added sugars, which implied that 
sugar-sweetened beverages are “uniquely or inherently unhealthy”—an implication with 
insufficient evidentiary support. Id. at 895–96.  The court concluded that Zauderer did not 
apply to a mandatory disclosure that forced advertisers “to convey San Francisco’s disputed 
policy views.” Id. at 896.  After rehearing en banc, the Ninth Circuit again concluded that the 
lower court abused its discretion in not granting a preliminary injunction against the ordinance. 
Am. Beverage Ass’n II, Nos. 16-16072, 16-16073, 2019 WL 387114, at *1 (9th Cir. Jan. 31, 
2019) (en banc).  However, the court’s reasoning was based solely on its determination that 
the disclosure requirement was unduly burdensome; it did not reach the question of whether 
the warning was factually accurate and uncontroversial. Id. at *5.  As noted above, the Ninth 
Circuit regards “factual and uncontroversial” as part of the Zauderer test rather than a limit on 
its scope. See id. at *4; supra note 19. 
 203. CTIA v. Berkeley II, 854 F.3d at 1118. 
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the public, or (3) where a claim is unverified or unsupported by the weight 
of scientific research.  One judge has implied that any dispute over accuracy 
places a disclosure outside of Zauderer’s scope.204  However, scholars have 
not seriously considered this standard, as it would mean that safety warnings 
long considered legal would be ineligible for Zauderer review.205 
Another position is that “reasonable” disagreement about the accuracy of 
a fact renders it “controverted.”206  Consequently, Zauderer would not apply 
if “even a substantial minority of scientists or the public” challenge the 
accuracy of the statement.207  However, this test seems inherently 
problematic from a policy standpoint, at least to the extent that it looks to 
public disagreement with the statement.  It would subject factual disclosures 
to heightened scrutiny whenever there is widespread misinformation—a 
situation where factual disclosures are arguably even more necessary. 
In contrast, Professor Micah Berman suggests that “factually accurate” 
could be interpreted similarly to “medically accurate,” which was defined in 
the Affordable Care Act as “verified or supported by the weight of research 
conducted in compliance with accepted scientific methods” and “published 
in peer-reviewed journals, where applicable” or recognized by “leading 
professional organizations and agencies with relevant expertise . . . as 
accurate.”208  Under this interpretation, a greater number of disclosures may 
be “factually accurate” and therefore eligible for deferential review.  The 
Northern District of California has argued that disagreement about the 
scientific basis for a disclosure does not make it “controversial.”209  To hold 
otherwise, the court said, would mean that “Zauderer would never apply, 
especially where there are health and safety risks” because “science is almost 
always debatable at some level.”210 
 
 204. See Nat’l Ass’n of Mfrs. II, 800 F.3d at 537–38 (Srinivasan, J., dissenting) (“To qualify 
as ‘purely factual and uncontroversial,’ in short, the disclosed information must in fact be 
‘factual,’ and it must also be ‘uncontroversially’ so, in the sense that there could be no 
‘disagree[ment] with the truth of the facts required to be disclosed.’” (alteration in original) 
(quoting Am. Meat Inst. v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric., 760 F.3d 18, 27 (D.C. Cir. 2016) (en banc))).  
 205. But see Barrella, supra note 15, at 540 (stating that a literal interpretation of Judge 
Srinivasan’s statement would lead to the incorrect conclusion that the government could not 
require warnings about smoking risks, inter alia, because some people dispute the accuracy of 
even well-established facts). 
 206. Royal, supra note 90, at 238; see also Barrella, supra note 15, at 541 (“The question, 
then, may be not only whether disagreement with the facts is possible, but reasonable 
disagreement.”).  Under this standard, a fact is controverted if empirical support for the 
information is sufficiently mixed that it could “cause a reasonable consumer to choose 
between two competing views”; “[o]ne fringe person arguing that the moon is made of green 
cheese will not do.” Royal, supra note 90, at 238.  This appears to be the standard adopted by 
the Ninth Circuit in American Beverage Ass’n I:  the court stated that the accuracy of the 
disclosure at issue was “in reasonable dispute.” 871 F.3d at 895. 
 207. Royal, supra note 90, at 238. 
 208. Berman, supra note 84, at 66 n.57 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 713 (2012)). 
 209. CTIA v. Berkeley I, 158 F. Supp. 3d 897, 904 (N.D. Cal. 2016), aff’d, 854 F.3d 1105 
(9th Cir. 2017), vacated and remanded, 138 S. Ct. 2708 (2018) (mem.). 
 210. Id.; see also Barrella, supra note 15, at 540 (“[A]nyone can (and many routinely do) 
disagree with the truth of factual matters, even ones that should be uncontroversial in light of 
all we know.”); Berman, supra note 84, at 66 n.57 (“[M]any well-established facts are 
contested by a small number of dissenters.”). 
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The focus on accuracy is arguably central to Zauderer’s rationale for 
extending greater deference to compelled commercial disclosures.  Because 
commercial speech is protected primarily for its value to consumers, a 
commercial speaker’s “constitutionally protected interest in not providing 
any particular factual information . . . is minimal.”211  However, where “the 
truth of information is seriously controverted,” the information no longer 
seems factual.212  Instead, the government essentially “forc[es] a speaker to 
endorse one or another opinion about the truth of the underlying 
information.”213  And as Zauderer emphasized, a state’s attempt to 
“prescribe what shall be orthodox in . . . matters of opinion” implicates 
substantial First Amendment interests.214  Thus, where the state compels a 
commercial speaker to convey another’s opinion, strict scrutiny—and not 
Zauderer’s “reasonable relationship” standard—will apply.215 
The interpretation of “purely factual and uncontroversial” to require only 
factual accuracy has been critiqued on textual, legal, and policy grounds.  The 
interpretation arguably renders the phrase redundant:  as the D.C. Circuit 
pointed out, “Is there such a thing as a ‘purely factual’ proposition that is not 
‘accurate’?”216  Furthermore, a disclosure may advance a controversial 
ideology even if it conveys accurate factual information.217  Compelled 
ideological speech implicates both the speaker’s autonomy interest and the 
listener’s interest “in a public discourse free of state compulsion.”218  
Because of the important interests at stake, if the government attempts to 
 
 211. Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626, 651 (1985). 
 212. Post, supra note 76, at 910. 
 213. See id. 
 214. See Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 651 (quoting W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 
U.S. 624, 642 (1943)).  Professor Sarah Haan suggests that the Zauderer Court, in establishing 
a lower standard for “purely factual and uncontroversial” disclosures, “may have really 
intended to preserve strict scrutiny for disclosures that cause the speaker to affirm an 
ideological message.” Sarah C. Haan, The Post-Truth First Amendment, 94 IND. L.J. 
(forthcoming 2019) (manuscript at 36), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm? 
abstract_id=3209366 [https://perma.cc/ELS8-TB9Q].  However, she argues that “‘purely 
factual and uncontroversial’ does not mean ‘non-ideological.’” Id. 
 215. See Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. Pub. Utils. Comm’n, 475 U.S. 1, 16, 19 (1986) (plurality 
opinion) (stating that the government may not “compel corporate speakers to propound 
political messages with which they disagree” unless the regulation is “a narrowly tailored 
means of serving a compelling state interest”). 
 216. Nat’l Ass’n of Mfrs. II, 800 F.3d 518, 529 n.28 (D.C. Cir. 2015).  But see id. at 537 
(Srinivasan, J., dissenting) (arguing that “purely factual and uncontroversial,” as a phrase from 
a judicial opinion, “should be ‘read in context,’ taking into account the whole of the court’s 
analysis” rather than “be[ing] parsed as though we were dealing with language of a statute” 
(quoting Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 442 U.S. 330, 341 (1979))); Barrella, supra note 15, at 533 
n.101 (“Descriptive redundancies are common in spoken and written language, non-legal as 
well as legal . . . .”).  According to Judge Srinivasan, Zauderer’s purpose of “providing 
consumers with useful information about products and services”—which is “the reason for 
protecting commercial speech in the first place”—is “honored” when a commercial speaker is 
required to disclose “purely factual” and “accurate” information. Nat’l Ass’n of Mfrs. II, 800 
F.3d at 537 (Srinivasan, J., dissenting). 
 217. Goodman, supra note 80, at 550; see also infra Part II.C.2. 
 218. Goodman, supra note 80, at 550. 
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force an individual or company to convey another’s ideology, it must prove 
narrow tailoring, not simply a reasonable relationship.219 
The interpretation may also be problematic from a policy standpoint, 
especially if a relatively low level of scientific consensus is required for a 
disclosure to be eligible for Zauderer review.  Overuse of warnings, 
particularly those that are unsubstantiated or relate to “extremely remote” 
risks, may cause people to doubt the credibility of warnings and disregard 
them.220  Furthermore, excessive disclosure requirements also raise 
constitutional problems, since they may not serve listeners’ interests.221  
Thus, factual accuracy alone may not sufficiently limit Zauderer’s scope. 
2.  Accurate Factual Information That Does Not 
Implicitly Convey Ideology 
An alternate interpretation is that “uncontroversial” imposes an 
independent legal standard that goes beyond “factual accuracy”222 and, 
therefore, that Zauderer does not apply to a disclosure if there is controversy 
over the “normative content or relevance” of the facts.223  Such disclosures 
arguably force a commercial speaker to implicitly convey a controversial 
ideology. 
The D.C. Circuit and Seventh Circuit, while not defining “controversial” 
precisely,224 have found that Zauderer does not apply to “opinion-based” 
disclosures.225  For example, the Seventh Circuit invalidated a state law 
requiring a sticker on any video game that met the statutory definition of 
“sexually explicit” because “[t]he sticker ultimately communicates a 
subjective and highly controversial message—that the game’s content is 
sexually explicit.”226  The court distinguished the labeling mandate from a 
requirement that manufacturers label products containing mercury because 
the definition of “sexually explicit” was “far more opinion-based.”227  In 
 
 219. See Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 650–51; supra Part II.A.1. 
 220. CTIA v. Berkeley II, 854 F.3d 1105, 1126 (9th Cir. 2017) (Friedland, J., dissenting in 
part), vacated and remanded, 138 S. Ct. 2708 (2018) (mem.). 
 221. See supra note 148. 
 222. Under this interpretation, a disclosure would also be excluded from Zauderer review 
if it does not contain accurate factual information. See Goodman, supra note 80, at 554. 
 223. Id. at 552.  The information’s relevance may be distinct from the question of whether 
the disclosure provides information about the product or “about the terms under which . . . 
services will be available.” See Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 651.  For example, a disclosure that a 
particular milk product was derived from cows treated with a synthetic growth hormone is 
information about the product, but may not be salient without evidence of health risks. See 
Int’l Dairy Foods Ass’n v. Amestoy, 92 F.3d 67, 74 (2d Cir. 1996) (“[C]onsumer curiosity 
alone is not a strong enough state interest to sustain the compulsion of even an accurate, factual 
statement.”). 
 224. Nat’l Ass’n of Mfrs. II, 800 F.3d 518, 528 (D.C. Cir. 2015); Entm’t Software Ass’n v. 
Blagojevich, 469 F.3d 641, 652 (7th Cir. 2006). 
 225. Entm’t Software Ass’n, 469 F.3d at 652. 
 226. Id. 
 227. Id. 
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other words, the video game disclosure conveys ideology because “the facts 
disclosed [were] evaluative facts228 embodying a contested norm.”229 
The D.C. Circuit has stated that “uncontroversial” imposes an additional 
legal test beyond whether the disclosure is “purely factual” and looks to 
whether the disclosure “communicates a message that is controversial for 
some reason other than [a] dispute about simple factual accuracy.”230  The 
court suggested that “[p]erhaps the distinction is between fact and 
opinion.”231  In support of its position, the court pointed to the Supreme 
Court’s warning in Pacific Gas & Electric Co. v. Public Utilities 
Commission232 that “Zauderer does not leave the state ‘free to require 
corporations to carry the messages of third parties, where the messages 
themselves are biased against or are expressly contrary to the corporation’s 
views.’”233  For example, the D.C. Circuit found that the description of a 
product as “conflict free” or “not conflict free,” while statutorily defined in 
relation to factual information about the origin of materials, was a “metaphor 
that conveys moral responsibility for the Congo war”—and thus was not 
“factual and non-ideological.”234  The court has also noted “the possibility 
that some required factual disclosures could be so one-sided or incomplete 
that they would not qualify as ‘factual and uncontroversial.’”235 
Furthermore, a disclosure may communicate a message that is 
controversial due to a disagreement about the need for that disclosure,236 
although this interpretation has not been adopted in any published opinions.  
It is, however, reflected in an unpublished Ninth Circuit opinion.237  San 
 
 228. Evaluative facts are those that “cannot exist without judgment,” unlike “natural or 
empirical facts that exist with little to no judgment involved.” Goodman, supra note 80, at 
546; see also William D. Araiza, Deference to Congressional Fact-Finding in Rights-
Enforcing and Rights-Limiting Legislation, 88 N.Y.U. L. REV. 878, 894–97 (2013) (stating 
that “[e]mpirical facts can be defined as facts whose truth or falsity can be tested by experience 
or experiment in the world,” whereas “[e]valuative facts are statements reflecting conclusions 
drawn from empirical facts” and “entail a mixture of empirical observation and value 
judgment”).  For example, killing is a “natural” fact because “[i]t exists in nature as the taking 
of a life,” while murder is an “evaluative” fact because it “entail[s] judgments as to justified 
homicide or self-defense.” Goodman, supra note 80, at 546.  Difficulty verifying an empirical 
fact—like “the degree to which human activity is causing climate change”—does not make it 
an evaluative fact. Araiza, supra, at 894. 
 229. Goodman, supra note 80, at 551. 
 230. Nat’l Ass’n of Mfrs. II, 800 F.3d 518, 528 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (alteration in original) 
(quoting Am. Meat Inst. v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric., 760 F.3d 18, 27 (D.C. Cir. 2016) (en banc)). 
 231. Id.  The court noted, however, that “it is far from clear that all opinions are 
controversial.” Id. 
 232. 475 U.S. 1 (1986). 
 233. Am. Meat Inst., 760 F.3d at 27 (quoting Pac. Gas & Elec. Co., 475 U.S. at 15 n.12). 
 234. Nat’l Ass’n of Mfrs. v. SEC (Nat’l Ass’n of Mfrs. I), 748 F.3d 359, 363, 371 (D.C. 
Cir. 2014), aff’d on reh’g, 800 F.3d 518 (D.C. Cir. 2015).  A manufacturer “may disagree with 
that assessment of its moral responsibility.” Id. at 371. 
 235. Am. Meat Inst., 760 F.3d at 27. 
 236. See Goodman, supra note 80, at 553 (“The work that ‘noncontroversial’ does in the 
advancement of consumer-autonomy interests is to impose a germaneness requirement on the 
state.”). 
 237. See CTIA-The Wireless Ass’n v. City & County of San Francisco (CTIA v. San 
Francisco II), 494 F. App’x 752, 753 (9th Cir. 2012). 
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Francisco required cell phone retailers to display a poster stating “[c]ell 
phones emit radiofrequency energy,” “[s]tudies continue to assess potential 
health effects of mobile phone use,” and the city’s recommendations for 
reducing exposure to radiofrequency energy.238  The Ninth Circuit found 
that, given the scientific uncertainty about the health risks of cell phone use, 
the city’s recommendations could “be interpreted by consumers as 
expressing San Francisco’s opinion that using cell phones is dangerous.”239   
The plaintiffs in Grocery Manufacturers Ass’n v. Sorrell240 advocated for 
a similar interpretation.241  Food manufacturers and retailers objected to a 
Vermont law requiring them to identify whether food was produced through 
genetic engineering.242  Although this was factual, the plaintiffs argued that 
the disclosure was “controversial” because, in the midst of a political and 
public debate about the safety of genetically engineered foods, the mandatory 
label implicitly conveyed the message that such foods were unsafe.243  
However, the court rejected the plaintiffs’ argument and stated that “the 
compelled information must, itself, be ‘controversial.’”244 
A factually accurate disclosure may thus imply a value judgment or 
suggest that a consumer should change her behavior due to potential health 
risks that have not been conclusively determined.  Through these implicit 
messages, the government advances its own position.  And while the 
government may take a side, it may not force a commercial speaker to carry 
its message in these “matters of opinion” without subjecting its actions to 
strict scrutiny, as Zauderer itself noted.245  Professor Ellen Goodman 
suggests that an interpretation of “uncontroversial” that looks to the salience 
of the disclosed facts would properly focus the analysis on “the cornerstone 
of commercial speech law:  consumer autonomy.”246  If the state forces 
commercial speakers to convey messages irrelevant to consumer choice, it 
essentially uses its power to regulate commerce “to build an ideological 
 
 238. CTIA-The Wireless Ass’n v. City & County of San Francisco (CTIA v. San 
Francisco I), 827 F. Supp. 2d 1054, 1057–58 (N.D. Cal. 2011), aff’d, 494 F. App’x 752 (9th 
Cir. 2012).  San Francisco acknowledged that research had not definitely established risks 
associated with cell phone use, but justified the disclosure requirement through the 
“Precautionary Principle, which provides that the government should not wait for scientific 
proof of a health or safety risk before taking steps to inform the public of the potential for 
harm.” Id. 
 239. CTIA v. San Francisco II, 494 F. App’x at 753.  Indeed, the WHO classifies radio-
frequency radiation as a “possible” carcinogen, a category which actually means that there is 
“no known statistical correlation” to cancer. CTIA v. San Francisco I, 827 F. Supp. 2d at 1060–
61. 
 240. 102 F. Supp. 3d 583 (D. Vt. 2015). 
 241. Id. at 621, 628. 
 242. Id. at 594. 
 243. Id. at 621, 628. 
 244. Id. at 628. 
 245. See Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626, 651 (1985). 
 246. Goodman, supra note 80, at 517. 
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platform.”247  Such state action improperly infringes upon listeners’ 
interests.248 
The proposition that a factual disclosure may be controversial due to 
disagreement over the salience of the facts assigns independent meanings to 
“purely factual” and “uncontroversial” and, thus, avoids rendering the phrase 
redundant.  In contrast, if the meaning of uncontroversial is “not opinion-
based,” as the D.C. Circuit and Seventh Circuit implied, “then the Zauderer 
test is reduced to ‘factual and not opinion-based’”—which does appear 
redundant.249 
Interpreting “uncontroversial” as “indisputably salient” has been criticized 
on policy grounds.  Professor Berman argues that the Ninth Circuit’s decision 
on San Francisco’s recommendations for reducing exposure to radio-
frequency energy “is troubling from a public health perspective” because it 
“would force legislatures to wait for the chimera of ‘scientific certainty’ 
before taking any action to disclose proven or potential risks, essentially 
rendering them powerless.”250  Legislatures may wish to “take proactive 
steps to avoid or mitigate potential harms, even if those harms are still 
speculative,” because by the time the risk is verified, it may be too late.251  
They may decide that the potential health risks justify the possible economic 
harm caused by a mandatory disclosure.252 
Furthermore, the proposition that the government must objectively convey 
factual information and not advance its own position cannot be applied too 
broadly—at least, not without subjecting longstanding disclosure 
requirements to heightened scrutiny.  The government “often seeks 
simultaneously to inform and to influence consumer purchases by mandating 
product disclosures,”253 like warning labels on cigarette packages.254  
Professor Goodman suggests one limiting principle:  “It is not the existence 
of a norm that raises constitutional concern but rather the insistence on a 
controversial norm.”255 
 
 247. Id. at 568–69. 
 248. Id.  Conversely, government interference may be warranted if the compelled messages 
are salient to consumers. 
 249. See Barrella, supra note 15, at 533 (characterizing the D.C. Circuit’s definition of 
uncontroversial as “not opinion-based,” and arguing that “if . . . ‘factual and accurate’ is a 
redundancy, it is hard to see how ‘factual and not opinion’ is any less so”).  Perhaps 
“evaluative facts” are not “facts” at all, but opinions—which could mean that they are 
excluded from Zauderer review because they are not “purely factual,” not because they are 
controversial. 
 250. Berman, supra note 84, at 72–73.  Professor Berman suggests that “warnings should 
be invalidated only if the government lacks a factual basis for the required statements.” Id. at 
73. 
 251. Id. at 76; see also supra note 238. 
 252. Berman, supra note 84, at 76. 
 253. Goodman, supra note 80, at 515. 
 254. Id. at 540–41. 
 255. Id. at 517. 
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Additionally, Pacific Gas’s language that a corporate speaker cannot be 
compelled to carry a message biased against its own views256 does not 
prohibit forcing a commercial speaker to disclose information contrary to his 
interests.  In Zauderer itself, the advertiser was required to include 
information he may not have wanted to disclose, and that might have caused 
him to lose potential customers—but the disclosure was nonetheless deemed 
“uncontroversial.”257 
3.  Factual Information That Is Not Related 
to a Controversial Subject Matter 
The Supreme Court and the Second Circuit have both interpreted 
Zauderer’s “uncontroversial” language to mean that a disclosure related to a 
controversial subject matter is not entitled to deferential review under 
Zauderer, though neither court explained its rationale.258 
Like the Supreme Court in NIFLA, the Second Circuit addressed the 
constitutionality of a law requiring crisis pregnancy centers to disclose 
information about abortion, contraception, and prenatal care.259  In a 
footnote, the court said that even assuming the city law regulated commercial 
speech, Zauderer did not apply because the law did not “require disclosure 
of ‘uncontroversial’ information” but rather required centers “to mention 
controversial services [opposed by] some pregnancy services centers.”260 
The NIFLA Court distinguished California’s licensed-clinic disclosure 
from the mandatory disclosure at issue in Planned Parenthood of 
Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey,261 which it characterized as a regulation 
of professional conduct that incidentally burdened speech, rather than a 
compelled commercial disclosure.262  Thus, under the NIFLA Court’s 
approach, the controversial subject matter of the disclosure at issue in Casey 
was irrelevant to the constitutional analysis.  Justice Breyer, in his dissenting 
opinion, criticized this distinction as inconsistent with “the rule of law,” 
which “embodies evenhandedness.”263 
From a textual standpoint, the NIFLA Court’s definition of “controversial” 
avoids the redundancy highlighted by critics of the factually accurate and 
not-opinion-based interpretations.264  However, it seems unlikely that the 
 
 256. Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. Pub. Utils. Comm’n, 475 U.S. 1, 15 n.12 (1986) (plurality 
opinion). 
 257. Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626, 651 (1985). 
 258. See Nat’l Inst. of Family & Life Advocates v. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. 2361, 2372 (2018); 
Evergreen Ass’n v. City of New York, 740 F.3d 233, 245 n.6 (2d Cir. 2014). 
 259. See Evergreen Ass’n, 740 F.3d at 249–50.  New York City Local Law 17 required that 
pregnancy services centers disclose, among other things, whether they “provide or provide 
referrals for abortion, emergency contraception, or prenatal care.” Id. at 249. 
 260. Id. at 245 n.6. 
 261. 505 U.S. 833 (1992). 
 262. Nat’l Inst. of Family & Life Advocates, 138 S. Ct. at 2373–74. 
 263. Id. at 2385 (2018) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“[T]here is no convincing reason to 
distinguish between information about adoption and information about abortion in this 
context.”). 
 264. See supra notes 216, 249 and accompanying text. 
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Zauderer Court conceived of “uncontroversial” as referring to the subject 
matter of the disclosure because the topic of the disclosure in Zauderer, 
contingent-fee arrangements,265 was itself controversial.266  Furthermore, 
even if the Court was referring to the subject matter, it is unclear whether the 
Court intended to establish uncontroversial subject matter as a prerequisite 
for the reasonable relationship test.267 
The possibility of interpreting “uncontroversial” as “uncontroversial 
subject matter” was widely rejected before NIFLA.268  Some criticism of this 
definition is driven by a concern that it overly impedes the government’s 
ability to use disclosures to advance public health goals.  Professor Robert 
Post argues that “mandated factual disclosures [should not] become 
constitutionally disfavored because they occur in circumstances of 
acrimonious political controversy,” since factual disclosures may be 
especially crucial “in the context of socially contested issues like tobacco or 
obesity.”269  While the NIFLA Court stated that it did “not question the 
legality of health and safety warnings long considered permissible,”270 it 
failed to explain what distinguished the licensed-clinic disclosure, motivated 
in part by the state’s concerns about women’s health, from those permissible 
warnings.271  Justice Breyer argued that, “[i]n the absence of a reasoned 
explanation” for this distinction, the Court’s “test invites courts around the 
Nation to apply an unpredictable First Amendment to ordinary social and 
economic regulation, striking down disclosure laws that judges may 
disfavor.”272 
The NIFLA standard could arguably be “highly controversial subject 
matter,” which would make more disclosures eligible for Zauderer review 
than merely “controversial subject matter.”  However, it is unclear exactly 
what that standard would mean, since courts have only used subject matter 
as a limit on Zauderer’s scope in the context of abortion-related 
disclosures.273  Perhaps “highly controversial subjects” are those that 
implicate an individual’s “most deeply held” ethical or religious beliefs.274  
 
 265. See Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626, 650 (1985). 
 266. See Stewart Jay, The Dilemmas of Attorney Contingent Fees, 2 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 
813, 813–16 (1989) (describing traditional arguments against contingent fees). 
 267. See supra notes 194–97 and accompanying text. 
 268. See, e.g., Nat’l Ass’n of Mfrs. II, 800 F.3d 518, 538 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (Srinivasan, J., 
dissenting) (“While it might be said that the Conflict Minerals Rule’s disclosure requirement 
touches on a ‘controversial’ topic, that alone cannot render the disclosure ‘controversial’ in 
the sense meant by Zauderer.”); Barrella, supra note 15, at 534 (describing such a definition 
as “impracticable”). 
 269. Post, supra note 76, at 910; see also Haan, supra note 214 (manuscript at 37) 
(“[C]ontroversial information—information that sheds light on a subject people care about—
has a high value to individuals and society.”). 
 270. Nat’l Inst. of Family & Life Advocates v. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. 2361, 2376 (2018). 
 271. Id. at 2381 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 272. Id. 
 273. See supra notes 174–76, 259–60 and accompanying text. 
 274. See Nat’l Inst. of Family & Life Advocates, 138 S. Ct. at 2379 (Kennedy, J., 
concurring) (emphasizing that the licensed-clinic notice “compels individuals to contradict 
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Or perhaps the simplest explanation is that abortion-related disclosures raise 
unique legal concerns275 and veer too close to the fact-ideology line for the 
Court to be comfortable with compelled disclosure. 
III.  WHAT “UNCONTROVERSIAL” MEANS FOR PUBLIC HEALTH 
Given the prevalence of mandatory disclosures as a regulatory tool,276 how 
courts interpret “uncontroversial”—and thus which disclosures are eligible 
for Zauderer’s deferential “reasonable relationship” test—has serious 
implications for public health.  This Part illustrates these implications by 
applying each interpretation to a hypothetical disclosure for an infant formula 
label: 
Compared to breastfed infants, formula-fed infants have a higher risk of ear 
infections, respiratory infections, gastrointestinal infections, and sudden 
infant death syndrome.277 
This disclosure reflects the breastfeeding research discussed in Part I.B and 
addresses a perceived information gap—the belief of many mothers that 
formula-fed infants are not more likely to get sick than breastfed infants.278  
It is also designed to comply with Zauderer’s prerequisite that the disclosed 
information relate to the product or service offered by the commercial 
speaker,279 in this case infant formula. 
Part III.A applies the “accurate factual information” test, Part III.B applies 
the “accurate factual information that does not implicitly convey ideology” 
test, and Part III.C applies the “controversial subject matter” test. 
A.  Outcome Under the “Accurate Factual Information” Test 
The hypothetical disclosure contains factual information, but its accuracy 
is contested.280  How the disclosure would fare depends on what level of 
 
their most deeply held beliefs, beliefs grounded in basic philosophical, ethical, or religious 
precepts, or all of these”). 
 275. See, e.g., Goodman, supra note 80, at 531 (describing “women seeking abortions” as 
“a special sort of listener, with much more liberty on the line than those in the typical product 
disclosure context”). 
 276. See supra notes 12, 82–83 and accompanying text. 
 277. This disclosure was crafted by the Note author.  By design, it differs significantly from 
a labeling mandate adopted by India in its implementation of the WHO Code.  India requires 
an infant formula label to include a conspicuous statement that “‘mother’s milk is best for 
your baby’ in capital letters.” Infant Milk Substitutes, Feeding Bottles and Infant Foods 
(Regulation of Production, Supply and Distribution) Act, No. 41 of 1992, INDIA CODE (1992).  
India’s disclosure seems more clearly normative—“best” is arguably an evaluative fact, if not 
an opinion.  Furthermore, what is “best” for a baby depends on the circumstances.  For 
example, where a mother is unable to breastfeed or pump at work, it is surely better for the 
mother to feed her child formula than to lose her job and be unable to pay the rent for their 
home. 
 278. See supra note 9 and accompanying text. 
 279. See supra note 174 and accompanying text. 
 280. See supra Part I.B.  Some of the controversy over the “Breast Is Best” policy is tied 
to the risks associated with insufficient lactation. See supra text accompanying note 67.  
However, those risks do not bear on the factual accuracy of the disclosed benefits, and a 
disclosure requirement does not prevent the formula company from including additional 
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controversy over its accuracy excludes a disclosure from Zauderer review:  
whether it is unverified or unsupported by the weight of scientific 
research,281 whether there is “reasonable” disagreement by scientists or the 
public,282 or whether there is any disagreement.283  The disclosure arguably 
satisfies a definition like “medically accurate” under the Affordable Care 
Act284:  it is “supported by the weight of research conducted in compliance 
with accepted scientific methods,”285 “published in peer-reviewed 
journals,”286 and recognized as accurate “by leading professional 
organizations and agencies with relevant expertise,” namely the AAP, CDC, 
and WHO.287  However, the disclosure would probably fail under the 
“reasonable disagreement” and “any disagreement” standards, since a 
controlled trial found no association between breastfeeding and the risk of 
respiratory infections288 and over 15 percent of American mothers do not 
believe that ear infections and respiratory illness are less likely in breastfed 
babies.289 
Whether the accuracy of the information is contested may also depend on 
whether a court or a consumer reading the label would assume it means that 
breastfeeding causes a reduced risk of the specified infections and SIDS.290  
As discussed in Part I.B, research on infant nutrition has established an 
association between breastfeeding and reduced risks of the specified 
conditions.291  However, because of ethical barriers associated with 
randomized controlled trials of infant feeding, scientists have been unable to 
establish causation.292  Thus, if the court thinks the disclosure suggests 
causation, it would likely fail regardless of the level of consensus required. 
Furthermore, a court could find that the accuracy of the disclosure is 
controversial if it conveys the message that any amount of formula-feeding 
 
factual, nonmisleading information on the label. See supra text accompanying note 67; supra 
note 133. 
 281. See supra text accompanying note 208. 
 282. See supra notes 206–07 and accompanying text. 
 283. See supra note 204 and accompanying text. 
 284. See 42 U.S.C. § 713 (2012); supra text accompanying note 208. 
 285. See 42 U.S.C. § 713.  The meta-analyses conducted by Dr. Victora and his colleagues 
show that most studies do indicate an association between breastfeeding and the designated 
benefits. See supra notes 46–50. 
 286. See 42 U.S.C. § 713.  The research discussed in Part I.B was published in prestigious 
peer-reviewed journals, such as Lancet and the Journal of the American Medical Association. 
See supra notes 46–50. 
 287. See 42 U.S.C. § 713; see also Code FAQ, supra note 3, at 3–5; Eidelman et al., supra 
note 25, at e828–29; Breastfeeding:  Why It Matters, supra note 27. 
 288. See supra note 48. 
 289. See supra note 9. 
 290. See Am. Beverage Ass’n I, 871 F.3d 884, 895 (9th Cir. 2017), aff’d on other grounds 
on reh’g, Nos. 16-16072, 16-16073, 2019 WL 387114 (9th Cir. Jan. 31, 2019) (en banc).  The 
Ninth Circuit’s analysis of a warning statement on sugar-sweetened beverages looked not only 
at the text of the required disclosure, but also at the message that it suggested to consumers, 
and evaluated the factual support for each. Id. 
 291. See supra notes 46–50 and accompanying text. 
 292. See supra notes 63–65 and accompanying text. 
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increases the risk of the specified conditions.293  The truth of that message is 
unknown because many studies fail to distinguish among categories of 
breastfeeding practices.294  Existing studies indicate that exclusive 
breastfeeding for the first six months is associated with the lowest risk of ear 
infections but also suggest a correlation with longer durations of 
breastfeeding.295  Similarly, “more intense breastfeeding” is associated with 
a lower risk of gastrointestinal infections.296 
B.  Outcome Under the “Accurate Factual Information That 
Does Not Implicitly Convey Ideology” Test 
The hypothetical disclosure would probably be eligible for Zauderer 
review under this interpretation of “uncontroversial,” assuming it first passes 
the accuracy test.297  The required information does not appear to be an 
evaluative fact,298 and it informs a consumer’s decision to buy infant 
formula. 
The hypothetical disclosure consists of empirical facts whose truth can be 
verified299—whether formula-fed infants actually do face higher risks of ear 
infections, respiratory infections, gastrointestinal infections, and sudden 
infant death syndrome.  While it may be more difficult to ascertain the 
relationship between breastfeeding and the specified risks than it is to identify 
the presence of mercury in a particular product,300 the practical difficulties 
do not transform the statement into an evaluative fact.301  It does not involve 
a value judgment.302  However, infant formula manufacturers might argue 
that it is a metaphor conveying moral responsibility303—that the disclosure 
essentially blames the companies for increased deaths and illnesses even 
though scientists have not shown that formula causes them.304  A formula 
company, like the plaintiffs in National Ass’n of Manufacturers v. SEC,305 
 
 293. Cf. Am. Beverage Ass’n I, 871 F.3d at 895.  The Ninth Circuit found that the accuracy 
of the warning statement was “in reasonable dispute” because it “convey[ed] the message that 
sugar-sweetened beverages contribute to [specified] health conditions regardless of the 
quantity consumed,” even though evidence suggested that overconsumption was responsible. 
Id. 
 294. See Eidelman et al., supra note 25, at e828 (describing the lack of a distinction 
between “any” and “exclusive” breastfeeding as a “[m]ajor methodologic issue[]”); Victora et 
al., supra note 46, at 476–78, 488. 
 295. See supra note 47 and accompanying text. 
 296. See supra note 49. 
 297. See supra note 222. 
 298. See supra notes 228–29 and accompanying text. 
 299. See supra note 228. 
 300. See supra text accompanying note 227. 
 301. See supra note 228. 
 302. See supra text accompanying notes 226–27.  The hypothetical disclosure also 
contrasts sharply with the infant formula labeling requirement adopted by India, which asserts 
the value judgment that breast milk is “best.” See Infant Milk Substitutes, Feeding Bottles and 
Infant Foods (Regulation of Production, Supply and Distribution) Act, No. 41 of 1992, INDIA 
CODE (1992). 
 303. See supra text accompanying note 234. 
 304. See supra notes 63, 65 and accompanying text. 
 305. 748 F.3d 359 (D.C. Cir. 2014), aff’d on reh’g, 800 F.3d 518 (D.C. Cir. 2015). 
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“may disagree with that assessment of its moral responsibility.”306  Thus, the 
disclosure may be ineligible for Zauderer review under this standard. 
The hypothetical disclosure, which conveys potential risks associated with 
infant formula, is salient to a caregiver’s decision whether to buy the product.  
The Ninth Circuit did not consider San Francisco’s recommendations for 
reducing exposure to radio-frequency energy to be salient because of 
scientific uncertainty about the health effects of cell phone use.307  The 
science in that case, however, was far less settled than the science about 
breastfeeding; there is no known statistical correlation between radio-
frequency radiation and cancer.308  But a court might conclude, given the 
debate about causation, that the disclosure impermissibly conveys the 
government’s opinion that infant formula is a significant health threat. 
C.  Outcome Under the “Controversial Subject Matter” Test 
It is difficult to determine how the hypothetical disclosure would fare 
under the “controversial subject matter” test, since the NIFLA Court offered 
no explanation for its position and no guiding standard.309  If any amount of 
controversy over the topic suffices to exclude a disclosure from deferential 
review under Zauderer, the hypothetical statement would fail.  As discussed 
in Part I.B, the “Breast Is Best” policy is a controversial topic.310 
However, the standard could actually be “highly controversial subject 
matter.”311  Whether the hypothetical disclosure would survive under this 
standard is uncertain, since courts have only applied it in cases about 
abortion-related disclosures.312  Perhaps a “highly controversial” topic is one 
that touches on only the “most deeply held” ethical or religious beliefs.313  
Infant feeding decisions do not seem to impact fundamental beliefs in the 
same way as abortion.  But regulations compelling formula manufacturers to 
carry pro-breastfeeding labels implicate parents’ fundamental rights to 
decide, within reason, what is best for their children,314 which might be 
considered “highly controversial.”  However, the NIFLA Court did not 
address this question.  And it is possible that the NIFLA Court’s decision is 
 
 306. Id. at 371. 
 307. See CTIA v. San Francisco II, 494 F. App’x 752, 753 (9th Cir. 2012). 
 308. See CTIA v. San Francisco I, 827 F. Supp. 2d 1054, 1060–61 (N.D. Cal. 2011), aff’d, 
494 F. App’x 752 (9th Cir. 2012). 
 309. The Court merely stated that abortion was “anything but an ‘uncontroversial’ topic.” 
See supra note 176 and accompanying text. 
 310. See supra Part I.B.  Indeed, even the FDA’s current labeling requirements for infant 
formula might fail under this standard. See supra text accompanying notes 39–43. 
 311. See supra notes 273–74 and accompanying text. 
 312. See supra notes 258–60 and accompanying text. 
 313. See Nat’l Inst. of Family & Life Advocates v. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. 2361, 2379 (2018) 
(Kennedy, J., concurring) (emphasizing that the licensed disclosure forced anti-abortion 
individuals to contradict those “deeply held beliefs”). 
 314. See Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720 (1997) (“[T]he ‘liberty’ specially 
protected by the Due Process Clause includes the right[] . . . to direct the education and 
upbringing of one’s children . . . .” (citations omitted)); see also supra text accompanying 
note 7.  This label arguably tips the scales in favor of breastfeeding as parents make their infant 
feeding decisions. 
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the result of a different analysis of “controversial”—namely, that abortion is 
special.  In any event, without a guiding standard, it is plausible that a judge 
who disapproves of breastfeeding or of state involvement in parenting 
decisions will decide that the hypothetical disclosure is not eligible for 
Zauderer review.315 
IV.  FACTUAL ACCURACY APPROPRIATELY LIMITS ZAUDERER 
How a hypothetical disclosure would fare under each interpretation is a 
decidedly different question than what the appropriate standard is or should 
be, but it illustrates the policy implications of each standard.  The “accurate 
factual information” test both represents the most logical application of 
Zauderer and produces the most desirable public policy outcomes.  In 
addition, because the NIFLA Court’s discussion of the “uncontroversial” 
element was conclusory, and because the Court’s ultimate reasoning seems 
more focused on other considerations, future courts considering the 
appropriate application of the “uncontroversial” test may conclude that 
NIFLA did not decide the issue after all and that the relevant considerations 
support the application of the “accurate factual information” test. 
While each interpretation of “factual and uncontroversial” finds some 
justification in the text of the Zauderer opinion and in the foundational 
doctrines, First Amendment principles and policy most strongly support 
“accurate factual information.”  Zauderer was firmly grounded in listeners’ 
interest in receiving factual information about the speaker’s goods or 
services,316 which enables them to make “intelligent and well informed” 
economic policy decisions.317  Whether the information touched on a 
controversial topic was irrelevant to the Zauderer Court’s constitutional 
analysis.318  Indeed, it may be particularly important for consumers to be 
well-informed about the health risks of products and services, even if those 
health topics are controversial.319  As the IMS Health Court acknowledged, 
the consumer’s informational interest “has great relevance in the fields of 
medicine and public health, where information can save lives.”320  And as 
long as the information is “factual,” the commercial speaker’s First 
Amendment interest in not providing that information is minimal.321  If the 
disclosed information veers too far over the line from fact into opinion—for 
example, if it has inadequate scientific support, or it seems more like a value 
 
 315. See supra text accompanying note 272. 
 316. See Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626, 651 (1985). 
 317. Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748, 765 
(1976). 
 318. As the Sixth Circuit and Judge Srinivasan argued, the absence of any reference to 
“uncontroversial” in Milavetz supports this hypothesis. See supra note 197 and accompanying 
text; supra note 200.  Furthermore, the disclosure at issue in Zauderer itself related to a 
controversial subject matter. See supra notes 265–66 and accompanying text. 
 319. See supra text accompanying note 269. 
 320. Sorrell v. IMS Health, Inc., 564 U.S. 552, 566 (2011). 
 321. See Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 651. 
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judgment than an empirical fact322—it would not be eligible for deferential 
review under Zauderer.323 
With regard to the level of factual accuracy required, the definition of 
“medically accurate” from the Affordable Care Act may provide an 
appropriate limit on Zauderer’s scope.324  It enables the government to 
inform consumers about a probable health risk without having to wait for the 
“chimera of ‘scientific certainty.’”325  Indeed, in the context of breastfeeding, 
ethical constraints on research prevent any certainty about causation.326  
Zauderer’s “reasonable relationship” test grants appropriate deference to a 
legislature’s determination that the potential health risks outweigh any 
economic harm rather than allowing judges, “who are not trained to be 
sophisticated reviewers of scientific literature,” to second-guess the factual 
basis for the disclosure.327 
Concerns about the requisite level of accuracy and salience of disclosures 
are well-founded.  The government will not achieve its public health aims if 
consumers ignore disclosures because the government has warned them, 
expressly or implicitly, about too many remote or unsubstantiated risks.328  
Furthermore, listeners’ interests may not be served if the inclusion of a 
government-mandated disclosure causes the advertiser to omit more valuable 
information.329  However, this issue could be addressed through a different 
aspect of the Zauderer opinion—if the government lacks a reasonable basis 
for concluding that the information is salient to consumers’ decisions about 
the product or service, the disclosure requirement would fail Zauderer’s 
“reasonable relationship” test as “unjustified or unduly burdensome.”330  
Additionally, a disclosure requirement may impose an undue burden if the 
message is overly disparaging of the speaker.331  However, courts should 
remember that commercial speech is much less likely to be chilled than 
political speech.332 
The NIFLA Court’s interpretation of Zauderer may reflect skepticism 
about differential treatment of commercial speech333 and Zauderer’s premise 
that compelled commercial disclosures implicate “weaker” First Amendment 
 
 322. See supra notes 225–29 and accompanying text. 
 323. See supra notes 214–15 and accompanying text. 
 324. See supra text accompanying notes 208, 284–87. 
 325. Berman, supra note 84, at 72–73. 
 326. See supra notes 63–65 and accompanying text. 
 327. Berman, supra note 84, at 76. 
 328. See supra text accompanying note 220. 
 329. See supra note 148. 
 330. See Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626, 651 (1985).  The reason 
why the information is important to consumers may also affect a court’s analysis of whether 
the disclosure requirement is justified.  Information about demonstrated health risks may 
justify mandatory disclosure.  However, information about whether a dairy product was 
derived from hormone-treated cows may be unjustified in the absence of scientific evidence 
creating a “reasonable concern.” See Int’l Dairy Foods Ass’n v. Amestoy, 92 F.3d 67, 69, 74 
(2d Cir. 1996). 
 331. Goodman, supra note 80, at 538. 
 332. See supra text accompanying note 128. 
 333. See supra note 117. 
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interests than restrictions.334  However, this approach is extremely 
problematic as it undermines the legislature’s ability to protect public health.  
Because nearly all human conduct occurs through written, spoken, or 
symbolic “speech,” the First Amendment has the potential to be a limitless 
deregulatory tool.335  This situation becomes even more perilous when the 
Court fails to provide guiding standards—as in NIFLA.  The Court claimed 
that it did “not question the legality” of longstanding health and safety 
warnings, but it did not explain how it distinguished the licensed-clinic 
disclosure in NIFLA from those warnings.336  The distinction may simply be 
that the licensed-clinic disclosure concerned abortion, the epitome of a 
controversial subject.  But because the Court did not explain its rationale, 
lower courts could use the “uncontroversial subject matter” test to strike 
down any disclosure they dislike.337 
However, there is arguably an opening for courts to adopt the “accurate 
factual information” test.  The Supreme Court in future cases, and lower 
courts as well, may conclude that NIFLA’s holding rested on the Court’s 
finding that the disclosure was not about the terms of the services offered by 
the clinics and that its reference to abortion as “anything but an 
uncontroversial topic” was merely dicta.338 
CONCLUSION 
Mandatory disclosures are increasingly used as a regulatory tool,339 but 
the constitutionality of these requirements is unsettled.  Recent developments 
in First Amendment doctrine, including a growing attentiveness to 
commercial speakers’ autonomy rights, pose a significant obstacle to 
governments seeking to promote public health through disclosures.  The 
Court’s position in NIFLA, that mandatory disclosures are not eligible for 
Zauderer review if they touch on a controversial subject matter, may prove 
particularly problematic.  But if lower courts read NIFLA as establishing a 
“highly controversial subject matter” standard and then give content to that 
standard, the impact of NIFLA may be mitigated. 
Factual accuracy provides an even more appropriate limit on Zauderer’s 
scope than “highly controversial subject matter.”  Public health issues are 
often the topic of intense political debate, but information about health risks 
is extremely important to consumers, as “information can save lives.”340  
Zauderer was firmly grounded in listeners’ interests in receiving factual 
information about a commercial speaker’s goods or services.  As long as the 
mandated information is “factual,” the commercial speaker has a minimal 
interest in not providing it to consumers.  Only if the government attempts to 
 
 334. See supra note 185. 
 335. See supra note 124 and accompanying text. 
 336. See supra text accompanying notes 270–71. 
 337. See supra text accompanying note 272. 
 338. See supra text accompanying notes 175–76. 
 339. See supra note 12. 
 340. Sorrell v. IMS Health, Inc., 564 U.S. 552, 566 (2011). 
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compel a commercial speaker to convey opinion—for example, where the 
disclosure is a value judgment or is not supported by the weight of scientific 
research—should heightened scrutiny apply.  While concerns about the 
salience of disclosures are well-founded, this issue may be addressed by 
evaluating whether a particular disclosure fails Zauderer review as 
“unjustified or unduly burdensome.”  This framework for compelled 
disclosures is more strongly supported by the text of Zauderer itself, and 
would grant proper deference to a legislature’s policy determination that the 
potential health risks justify a disclosure. 
